Three maJOr banks have now admitted that their emp loyees manipulated worldwide interest rates tlu·ough the London lnterbank Offered Rate (Libor), the most widely used interest rate index. Libor is the interest rate term fo r trill ions of dollars of swaps and loans, and its manipulation may have been used to extract billions o f dollars. These allegations come just as commodities manipulation law has been dramatically reformed and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) given vast new reg ulatory powers. T his Aliicle provides the first extended, scholarly analysis of the CFTC's new anti-manipulation rules. We consider the difficulty the rules address: Commodities manipulation c laims have tradition all y faced nearly insuperable obstacles to success in prosecuting manipulations like that of Libor. We then analyze the new rules, including their extension of the CFTC's powers to cover the swap market. The new rules appropriately lower the standards of pleading and proof, and yet the breadth of the new rules invites abuse. Both to implement the new rules and to prevent overuse, we argue for more elaborate, sophisticated, and creative economic analysis than ever before. We provide a wide-ranging overview of empi1ical too ls for assessing manipulation claims, w hile re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place of empiricism in the laws of evidence and intent. We provide detailed
I NTRODUCTION
Commodities manipulation claims have always been a mug's gamc. 1 Lacking so much as a definition within any statute, ru le, or case, !he concept of commod ities manipulation is profoundly confused. Amidst the law's confusion, advice from scholars varies. There is no scholarly consens us as to the existence of manipulation, let alone the appropriate definition and avenue for prevention.
What emerges from the confusion is an almost unwinnabl c set of burdens. P laintiffs must establish a manipu lative intent that is conccptcJally and doctrina lly among the most demanding mental stale requ irements anywhere in financia l law. Moreover, the evidence for such intent is typicall y only high ly ambiguous public behavior. Plaintiffs must a lso establ ish that the defendant's conduct causally resulted in an "artifi cial price," the definition of which is again confused and burdensome. Worst of all, coutts have often been hostile to the use of statistical and economic arguments in buttressing and eva luating manipulation claims.
Unsurprisingly, the CFTC has won onl y one case in thirty-seven years? Private plaintiffs arc likely to prefer to plead Shennan Act section 2, which does not req uire a showing of intent, and whi ch has long been amenable to economic analysis. Even the Sherman Act's challenging market power clement is j ust one part of manipulation 's price artificia lity element.
Yet, all at once, dramatic manipulation reform has arrived. T he law governing market manipu lation has been significantly altered: language tracking securities fraud prohibitions has been added, an attempt prong incorporated, and the scope of manipulation extended to include reckless manipulative conduct.
Also, under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC is instructed to regulate swaps, which arc no longe r exempt from the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 3 rvol. 15:2 Dodd-Frank explicitly creates anti-manipulation rules that apply to swaps and commoditi es alike. 4 With a mandate and significantly expanded antimanipulation authority under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has adopted potent new regulations to prosecute manipulation under the CEA. 5 Although these new powers are broad and potentially dangerous, they arc responding to increasing concern about the swap market. Regulation of swaps is of profound impm1ance. At least $500 trillion do llars in notional value arc at stake in the global swap market. This money has hithet1o operated in a large ly lega lly unaccountable space, uncleared and subject to opaque management; one need onl y remember the concerns at the time of the AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns fa ilures to remember the systemic wonies of swap fai lurc. 6 Abuses in the swap market underlie today's biggest fmancial story. Media, academics, consultants, regulators, and plaintiffs are increasingly focused on the $400 trillion dollar interest rate swap market as allegations surface that L ibor, the benchmark for most of the world's swaps/ may have been manipulatcd. 8 All over the world, major banks are admitting their employees' complicity in one of the greatest financ ial heists in history. 9 Altering the interest rates paid by home mortgage borrowers and received by pension funds may have generated billions of dollars of illicit profits. Tf Congress was content to allow commodities manipulation before, it has 4. /d. § 753. 5. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices; Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41 ,3 98 (July 14, 20 II).
6. See, e.g., Editorial, AIG and Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009 , at A26 (suggesting that "[fJor the last year, the entire Beltway theory of the financial panic has been based on the claim that the 'opaque,' unregulated CDS market had forced the Fed to take over AlG and pay off its countcrparties, lest the system collapse"). 7. L/BOR: The world's most important number, MONEYWEEK, Oct. 10, 2008, available a/ http://www.moneywcek.corn/pcrsonal-financellibor-the-worlds-most-importan t-numbcr-138 16; BBA L!BOR: Th e world's most important number now tweets daily, BB A LIOOR, May 2 1, 2009, available at http://www.bbalibor.com/ncws-rcleases/bba-libor-theworlds-most-important-number-now-tweets-daily; Donald McKenzie, What's in a Number?, 30 LONDON REV. BOOKS I I (2008) (noting that "Libor anchors contracts totaling about $300 trillion, the equivalent of $45,000 for every human being on the planet"); cf Carrick Mollcnkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cas/ Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008 , at AI (reporting that $500 trillion in contracts are indexed to Libor); INT'L MONETARY FUND GLOBAL fiNAN CIAL STAOII.ITY REPORT: f iNANCIAL STRESS AN D DELEVERAGJNG MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY xv (2008) (obsetvi ng that "the LIBOR rates arc estimated to underpin some $400 trillion of financial derivatives contracts").
8 ST. J., Feb. 17, 20 12, at C l. 20 13] REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW 361 signaled that commod ities exchange prosecution is not to be dead letter. Swaps are simply too important and too relevant to slip through the cracks.
In response to these dramatic events and shifts in the legal landscape, this Article makes three principal contributions. l t serves as the first scholarshi p to examine and explain the new CEA anti-manipulation powers.
In explicating these provisions, this Article explains the deficiencies the new provisions were meant to address, as well as the shortcomings and risks of the new manipulation rules. Second, it urges the increased usc of statistical and economic tools in the eva luation of manipulation claims, arguing for their pm1icular importance in this domain. T hird, it provides examples of how courts have used such tools, and how they might best usc them in the future.
The structure of the Article is as fo llows . In Part I, we explore and defin e manipulation. We then examine the law and theaty of commodities manipulation as it ex isted prior to Dodd-Frank. In Part II, we explain the changes within and attendant to Dodd-Frank and provide a rationale for some of the most controversial parts or these reforms, including a lowered scienter requirement. ln Part III, we then urge increased use of statistical and economic tools in the evaluation of manipulation claims, particularly at the pleading stage. These screens should be used offensively and defensively. Many manipulation schemes will be initially detected only by screens. Conversely, courts may wish to spare defendants the expense of discovery where there is scanty statistica l evidence or manipulation . This wi ll help limit the intimidating reach of the new rules. In the process, we give extensive examples of how these screens might work, based both on theory and on our professional experiences.
Arguments about the appropriate weight that should be g iven to empirical analyses in litigating intent belong to the genetic code of evidence law and scholarship. 10 They can delve into the deep weeds of statistical detail, but they are ultimately disputes as to the epistemology of cornis and agencies-arguments about how it is possible for a fact finder to know the facts upon which a judgment must ultimately rest. This At1icle [Vol. 15:2 re-engages that debate from within manipulation law. lt demonstrates both the law's current uses-often appropriate, and sometimes grudging-of empirical methods of establish ing the four clements commonly associated with manipulation by providing an explication of the prominent uses of these methods in imp01tant litigation. Particularly with regard to intent, statistical and econometric methods arc of greater imp01tancc to establishing or discrediting a plaintiffs case than many expect.
l. MAN IPULATION BEFORE DODD-FRANK: INSUPERABLE

A. Definitions of Manipulation
The dysfunctional state of pre-Dodd Frank anti-manipulation law is perhaps best reflected in the statutory, doctrinal, and scholarly confusion concerning the concept of manipulation itself. Below we canvass this muddled tenitory. The CEA makes it a felony "to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of ... any commodity .... " 11 and creates a private right of action to accompany the government's civi l and criminal enforcement capabilities. 12 Yet no statute, regulation, or case defines manipulation for the pw-poses of the Commodity Exchange Act. 13 According to Williams, "[t]he reason the Congress, the ABA, and the courts have not crafted an all-encompassing definition of ' manipulation"' is because " [t] he concept is a constantly evolving onc." 14 Others give a more pessimistic diagnosis: want of a defmition has left the law "a murky miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect." 15 II. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 12. !d. § 22(a); id. § 25(a)( I) ("Any person ... who violates this chapter or who willfully aids ... a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting ffom one or more of the transactions referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this paragraph and caused by such violation .... "). It was not always clear that there would be such a private right. See PHILIP McBR IDE JOJJNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 1462 (2d. cd. 1989 .
13. See In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Inc., [1982] [1983] [1984] Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,281 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) (explaining that "[n]either manipu lation nor attempted manipulation is defined in the Commodity Exchange Act. That task has fallen to case-by-case judicial development"); cf Prohibition on Price Manipulation, supra note 5, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41406-07 ("The Commission declines to adopt comments proposing a new economics-based definition of manipulation. Instead. as stated above, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered in determining whether a violation of final Rule 180.1 exists."); Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.) (declining to define manipulation), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 654 ( 1933) .
14. JEFFREY C. WILLIAM S, MANII'ULATION ON TRIAL: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND TilE HUNT SiLVER CASE xvi ii ( 1995) . With no determinative account, administrative and judicial opm10ns offer a grab bag of accounts of manipulation. Tn In re Henner, the hearing of(iccr's opinion stated that: "Manipul ation" is a vague term used in a wide and inclus ive manner, possessing varying shades of meaning, and almost always conveying the idea of blame-worthiness deserving of censure. There is usually also an implication of artificia lity and of skillful and ingenious ma nagement. In its most common use it has reference to a speculator, or to a group of speculators who buy or sell produce, in such a way as to give outsiders the impression that such buying o r selling is the result of natural forces. Hence the term includes excessive speculation, the spreading of fal se rumors, the working of syndi cates to increase or depress prices, "wash sales," "matched orders," and "corners." 16
All of these notions-blameworthiness, artificiality, speculation, false impressions and rumors, collusion to affect price, and specific practicesare associated with manipulation, and each has held prominence in legal the01y and in the law at some point.
Scholars and observers have been encouraged to offer definitions, and resulting interpretations of the state of the law, but the only ground of agreement has proved to be the difficulty of proving manipulation. As one scholar has put it, "Manipulation is diffi cult to define .... [D] rawing a line between healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved to be too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory tool." 17 A recurrent theme is the identification of manipulation with distorted or unnatural prices. JK The former president of the New York Cotton Exchange at Congressional hearings on cotton price fluctuations defined manipulation as:
Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 202, 205 (1979) (calling manipulation law "an cmbanassmcnt-confusing, contradictory, complex, and unsophisticated").
16. 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 Dec. (U.S.D.A. 1971 . 17. Lower, supra note I, at 392; Craig Pin·ong, Squeezes, Corpses, and the Anti-Manipulation Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 REGULATION , no. 4, 1994 at 54 ("[T] o define j ust what manipulation means .... is a more difficult task than one might think, because the term ' manipulation ' is used very imprecisely and indiscriminately.").
18. For artificia lity in antitrust, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oi l Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("[M] anipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts those prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition alone.").
[A]ny and every operation or transaction or practice, the purpose of which is not primarily to facilitate the movement of the commodity at prices freely responsive to the forces of supply and demand; but, on the conn·ary, is calculated to produce a price distortion of any kind in any market either in itself or in its relation to other markets. 19 Likewise, Matthijs Nclcmans has examined the connection between the action and price pressure. 20 Easterbrook is critical of efforts to find manipulation in artificial prices: An effort to isolate which "forces of s upply and demand" arc "basic" and wh ich arc not is doomed to failure. What is a "basic" demand? Economists think of supply and demand as givens. People demand what they demand, and never mind the reasons why. . . . There is no way to say what demand is real and what is artificial. 2 1 Against objective accounts/ 2 he proposes a subjective account that emphasizes deceitful intent, a position several scholars share.23
Yet, there are problems with deceit-based accounts as well. It seems that some manipulation comes not from deceit, but from some exercise of market power. Pirrong and Russo both note that some manipulation concerns "the elimination of effective price competition in a market for cash conunodities and/or futures contracts through the domination of supply or demand, and the exercise of that domination to intentionally Of course, the more basic question ts whether there LS suc~1 ~ .thrng as manipulation at all. Fischel and ~oss bcli~ve " legal pt:oht?lttons a,re unnecessary" in the futures markets. 2 ' They clatm that no. obje~t1ve test can detect manipulation, and all subjective tests that find mampulatton also find fraud. 29 As a result, there is no manipulation beyond wha~ the law of fraud can already address. They arc skeptical as to the ex1s~encc of whole categories of putative manipulation, asserting that the~ are li kely to be ~elf detening. The need to make prices rise through tradm?, but only qpe' the manipulator has acquired the commodity "creates .an mh·act~bl e dtlet~ma for the potential manipulator." 30 The h·ading bchav1or that dnves up pnces for others drives up prices for the manipulator too, who must also face h·ansaction costs. [VoL 15:2 urge an end to the definitional and regulatory enterprise. Fischel and Ross's manipulation nihilism is not the end of the discussion: Steve The! responded that far more can alter price than 11-aud and fictitious tradcs. 34 For example, a broad category of contract-based trades, such as executi ve compensation agreements, may be triggered by changes in external prices. If the payoff from the contract is great enough, it can be rational for a contractor to bid up the price of the assct. 35 T his manipulation is plaus ible and docs not seem to be fraud.
B. Common Types ofManipulation
If it is challenging to find scholarly consensus on the proper definition of manipulation, it must s uffice to define manipulation ostensibly, by pointing out several examples that are broadly accepted as manipulation, if only because the CEA does the same.
It specificall y prohibits " bucket[ing]" an order/ 6 "wash sale[s]," and "accommodation trade [s] ." 37 An effort to compile an exhaustive list of different manipulative schemes is likely to be incomp lete since " [t]he methods and techniques of manipulation arc limited only by the ingenuity of man." 38 That said, three main categories of manipulation are broadly accepted: delivery impairment, fa lse information, and market rigging. 39 Delivery impairment includes cases that exploit disruptions in the delivery mechanisms, often by dominating or interfering with the supply of a cash commodity. Such manipulations arc possible in commodities markets because of the relationship between the "cash" or "spot" market and the futures market. The cash market represents a purchase or sale of the existing commodity, while the futures market represents a promise to buy or sell in the future. Most futures contracts arc cash settled, meaning the commodity is never deli vered-the contract owner agrees to accept the value of the commodity instead. However, the contract owner, or "the long," usually has the ri ght to demand p hysical deli very of the commodity, forcing her counterparty to purchase the commodity on the cash market. When the cash market is in some way impaired, and so delivery is impracticable, "the shmi" will have few options but to accept unfavorable 34. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation , 79 CORNELLL. REV. 2 19 ( 1994 
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REVOLUTION TN MAN IPULATION L AW 367 tenns of deli very or settlement. To make a stylized example, a short in the oi l futures market may promise to deliver ten ban·cls of o il in a year to the long for $ 100 per barrel. That may seem like a fine deal if oil is currentl y trading for $90 per barrel. T he short expects to settl e her contract either w ith cash or by buying oi l at the market price and then del ivering it in satisfaction of her cont,-act. However, it may be that the long insists on delivery at precisely the time that there arc only five barrels for sale w ithin easy shipment of the point of delivery. The short is in a bind; to sati sfy her contract, she must contemplate transporting oil from fa r away at great cost. With local delivery so impaired, she may be willing to pay the long an attractive premium to satisfy her contract and, in any event, to pay a king's ransom for the five barre ls that arc available for delivery.
Squeezes and corners are two well-known de li very impairment scenarios. A corner is a kind of manipulation in which someone, taking advantage of the anonymity of futures trading, establ ishes a large [long] futures position calling for delivery in a pat1icular delivery month. Waiting until those who have the contrachtal obligation for delive1y have little time remaining, the cornerer surprises them by appearing eager to stand for delivery. Meanwhile, having obtained much of the deliverable grade locally available, the manipulator leaves those committed to make delivery the unenviable choice of paying express charges for transpmiation or . 40 buying back the futures contracts at a premtum. While in a corner, the trader has control of virtually a ll of the available suppl y of the commodity underl ying the futures contracts held by the tTadcr, 4 1 in a squeeze a trader acquires a large fu tures position when there is a shotiage of the underlying commodity. 42 A squeeze occurs in the futures market alone, whereas a corner also involves manipulation in the 40. WiLLIAMS, supra note 14, at 6; see also Gilbc1t, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that '"[t]he terms corner and squeeze tend to be used synonymously, but it is neverthcl~ss t_tscfi._tl to follow Kyle ( 1984) in distinguishing between them. The crux of Kyle 's dJsttnctton ts whether the manipulator takes positions on the underlying physica l market to create an artificial shortage (a corner), usually in conjunction with futures market positions; or whether he operates solely in the fi.tturcs market but exploits the delivery mechanism to dist01t the price of a particular future away fi·om fi.mdamental va lues (a squeeze). Squeezes, he notes, are over once delivery is made, while corners tend to last longer"). 41. Markham, supra note 1, at 283. 42. !d. at 284 n.8 ("[A] squeeze may be intentionally created or it may result from a natural sh01tagc that traders seek to exploit. The latter event is frequently referred to as ' congestion. "') (citing Rt:I'OR"I OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATION 40 (Sept. 25, 1939) ). Futt hcr, a corner is unique in that the long party must " bury the corpse" (sell off the commodity) afterwards wi thout depressing prices and rendering the corner unprofitab le. Markham, supra note I, at 294 ("[An] FTC study found that congestion has price effects nearly as severe as a comer that is del iberately contrived to squeeze the shorts."). fVol. 15:2 cash markct. 43 That is to say that a squeeze is possible where the manipulator has taken no long or short positions in the underlying commod ity.
Delivety impairment strategies often require substantial amounts of capital and staying power, as well as tolerance for risk. Tf deli very proves easier than the manipulator guessed, then she m ay fmd herself receiving large suppl ies for which she has no usc, and w ithout enjoying a substantial price effect.
For this reason, asymmetric information can be the manipulator's a ll y. A corner or squeeze is easier if the manipulator knows that delivery is likely to be impaired at some point. 44 The second category of manipulative conduct, the spreading of false infonnation, involves the indirect disruption of supply and demand by creation of a state of misinformation in the market place. Large amounts of buying or selling may sometimes send false signals to market participants that they too should buy or sell, but this is an expensive and unreliable techniq uc. 45 More common procedures are the dissemination of false information or impressions through rumors or price reports, or "wash sales"-transactions w ith one's self or affiliates with no economic substance. Such manipulation requires little to no capital and tends to be relatively short-! ivcd, as the market self-corrects. The last type of manipulation, which we may call market rigging, involves attempts by market professionals to tamper with the market by vittue of their position within the system of trade. For example, prices could be artificially high because brokers s imply execute at an artificially high price to the disservice of their clients. This type of manipulation generall y depends upon some or all of the following factors: lack of market liquidity (however short-term), conspiracy or at least tacit acceptance by a substantial number of market professionals, and some defect in the future's contract terms or some inefficiency in the cash market such that delivery of cash commodity is not practical. We may also include front-running, when a broker, having just received a large incoming transaction, trades on his own account in order to profit from the effects of a subsequent execution of the client order.
Many kinds of manipulation include clements fi·om more than one of these gene ral manipulative strategies. For example, a delivery impairment manipulation may be easier if one spreads false information about one's 43. Russo, supra note 39, § 12-10. own posttton. Secrecy is important, as people know that it is dangerous to promise to deli ver wheat to someone who already owns most of the deliverable wheat. If a trader did enter the contract by acc ident and found out about supply conditions, she could bring new supplies to the market (say, making arrangements for new wheat to be grown and deli vered) to reduce the premium she must pay to cancel her obligations. The manipulator will profit most if he can keep the trader fi·om realizing her d . 46 pre tcament. Another mixed strategy may be found in a short-squeeze, which aims to depress pri ces to artificially low levels. In thi s instance, the manipulator becomes the short in a number of futu re contracts and then places into delivcty a very large ammmt of the cash commodity. Not only does the dump of cash commodity onto the market tend to depress the value of the commodity, and therefore help the short contract, it also gives her an opportunity to threaten to actual ly deliver the commodity in the future . A large number of conunodity traders may not actually want to own the cmmnodity; they may be pme speculators, or perhaps they are using the commodity as a proxy for some other hedging purpose. For example, a fa rmer, afraid that synthetic ferti lizer costs may go up with energy prices, could buy oil futures without actually wanting to receive oil. If she is fo rced to take delivery, she is likely to sell the oil quickly. If the manipulation is successful, a selling spree may be touched off by longs rushing to liquidate or rctende r del iveries received at increasingly lower prices. 47 A short-squeeze may be difficult to cany out because it often requires substantially more capital than long manipul ations and is unaided by development of natural conditions such as natural squecze. 4 s A crucial risk in the short squeeze is the possibility of large longs in the market with the capacity to "stop" deli very (i.e., take delivety of the physical commodity). lf the short dumps cheap oil into the market, but someone is ready to receive the oil, the shot1 will lose substantially.
C. Legal Standard of Manipulation
For all that, the law has long prohibited manipulation. It is common to say, with the CFTC, that fo ur clements make up a CEA manipulation: ( I) a manipulative act or omission; (2) intent; (3) causation; and ( 4) attificial 46. Easterbrook, supra note 21 , at S I 06.
47. In re Hollenberg Bros., [1975 -1977 49 Commodities manipulation law has not looked to fraud or deception di rectly, unlike the securities regime. Instead, this four-pa1 1 test focuses on market-power manipulation, typical ly the result of trading. The legal and evidentiary standards for these clements are, in la rge part, the subject of subsequent sections (other than man ipulative acts, which we considered, in part, above). It is common for investigations and trials to concentrate on causation and artificia lity of price together, on the on~ hand, and intent on the other. This section elaborates the ways in w luch these standards arc implemented with an emphasis on the use of econometric proof.
l . Price Artificiality and Causation
P~ice artific iality has been called the sine qua non of manipulation. 50 An a rt1fic~a l price is one that does not "refl ect basic fo rces of supply and de mand.", 1 Where prices are mtificial, they do not reflect all possible market factors and create "conditions which p revent the futmes market fr~~ performing its basic economic function and hence [diminish] its uhhty to those members of the trade and general public who rely on its basic purposes." 52 But manipu lations that fail to create an artificial price have generally not been a concern since, "[i]t is genera lly considered that none of [the evils of manipulation] occur absent distorted or artificial p rices." 53 Attificiality has been essential, in pa1t, to focus enforcement where hann has been done. The manip ulator must have caused the art ificia l price, but she need not be the singular cause of the artificial price: "It is enough, fo r p m·poses of a finding of manip ulation in violation of section 6(b) and 9 of the [A)ct, that respondents' action contributed to the price [movement). " 54 49. In re Cox, [ 1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ,, 23,786 at 34,061 (CFTC July 15, 1987) ; see also In re Amaranth Natura l Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. S upp. 2d. 513, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Russo, supra note 39, at § 12-11 . As pointed out below, the respondent docs not have to be culpable of the entire difference bct\vecn arti fi cial and. the market prices that would have prevailed under manipu lation. 
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Although some scholars question the coherence of a notion of "artificial pricc," 55 all agree that artificiality is not sel f-cvident. Hence, from the beginning, artificiality was in need of proof and courts have oft~n allowed use of econometric analysis. In Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, a classtc comer in the Chicago Board of T rade (CBOT) in bushels of wheat, the plaintiff'_s expert proposed four tests for art.ifici~l prices cl~aracteristic ~~a squeeze,, 6 three of which constitute an hl~ton.ca l a.nalysts of pas.t P~ tee movements 57 : (i) analyzing the allegedly arttfictal pncc movement m ltght of price movements in the past nine years; (ii) comparing the spread between the allegedly manipulated future and the n~xt clo~est future a.~?
comparing its movement to spreads over the prevtous ntne years; (111) evaluating the exchange h·aded futures prices with equal futures o~ oth~r exchanges as compared to prior years; and (iv) determinin~ the rela.ttonshlp between the allegedly manipulated future close to delivery wtth cash • SK pnces. . . . . The price artificiality inquiry need not be lnruted JUSt to pnce trends:
T he viability of manipulation often depends on the knowledge of mar~et pa11icipants and the structure of the market. Judge Easterbrook explams the Court's decision in finding Cargill liable for manipulation: "Cargill had used its special knowledge to advantage-it profited not because it knew more about the demand and supply of wheat in the cash mar~et but because it alone knew who owned the deliverable w heat in Chicago.", 9 Judge Easterbrook goes on to point out the simultanei ty of price spikes n 1 tures will reflect precipitous drops in the prices of fresh eggs. This testimony was corroborated by statistics dealing with these relative prices du~·ing the yea.rs . 1932-1947." ).
Russo points out that the cou11 neglected to subject the statistiCS to any s1gn1ficance tests.
Russo, supra note 39, § 12-26. 55. Easterbrook, supra note 21.
. . . Similarly, Markham points to a Federa l Trade Commission ("FTC") study whe re " it [is] noted that nahrra l squeezes and com ers generally relate to the peculiarities of the futures markets rather than to supply and demand conditions," 60 reinforc ing the need for detailed economic analysis on the but-for price to assist in the determination of an artificial price, and on the possible causes of such effect. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook suggests some of the analyses that an economist should undertake when dealing with an alleged manipulation. He writes:
The CFTC in
Someone searching for manipulation might look for asymmetri c information. He also might look fo r the telltale s ign of sudden price fluchmtions. When the closing price on a futures contract significantl y di verges from the price of the cash commodity immediately before and after, this is strong evide nce that someone has reduced the accmacy of the market price and inflicted real economic loss on participants in the market. Courts usually look for both concealment and sudden swings in priee. 61
In 1953, in Great Western Food Distributors, i nc. v. Brannan, 62 the court found manipulation on the grou nds that egg futures p rices did not drop to a nonnal relationship with fresh eggs and other egg prices. 63 T he court looked at three instances to show that prices had been manipulated and were artifi cially high. First, the govemment showed that the supply of refrigerated eggs in the allegedly manip ulated December 1947 contract was higher than it had been in two previous months as wel l as in December o f 1946. It ftut her showed that real demand, as opposed to technical demand created by a cornering operation, was lower in December 1947 than in the previous months. T he court rej ected the foregoing evidence stating that the govern ment fa iled to prove similar market conditions and prices in the comparative months. Second, the p laintiff provided evidence of the histori cal spread relationships between December and J anuary futures at the close of tradi ng in the December futures during the years 1932-1948 (excluding some observations where price controls were in effect) and compared it to the allegedly manipulated Decembe r 1947 ftrtures. Third, the court looked at the excessive premium of cash to futures eggs in light of a historical constant premium that existed even during volati le price episodes. 64 In this case, proof that prices were manipulated or artificially Evidence on pncc relationships, comparing silver to other meta ls incl ud~g gold an~ bull ion to coins was also presented on the defense s1dc. A vanety of tests fo r price artificia li ty and causation were applied, fo r example by comparing silver and gold prices an_ d u~ing _"Grangcr~causal ity" tests to dctem1ine whether the tradmg 111 stlver had rnfluenccd gold. T he defendants used an ccon~metr~ic model to dis~inguish the Hunts' tradi ng from other posstblc mfluences on stl ver by relating the dai ly chan ges in their posit~o~s to th~ d~ily changes in the prices of silver, and found no stat1strcall y stgm~cant effect from the Hunts' h·ading. T hey also presented correlatiOnS among bullion price to show the geographic extent of the market and introduced evidence on pri ce relationships from several other markets. 66 T he plaintiffs economic experts presented stati~~ical s~tdies o~ silv~r exchange-approved vaults . Attention was also drawn to specific acts, such as the delivcrables taken, as evidence of manipulative inte nt. The plaintiffs experts analyzed the fo llowing indicators, which they argued flagged manipulation: the sil ve r/gold ratio, the coin/bullion differential, the price spread with more distant deli very dates, and the variability of prices.
Williams presents a very detailed description of all of the economic and empirical analyses performed, their advantages, and limitations. 67 Economists presented analyses addressing all of the relevant four-part tests of manipu lation, and as Wil liams describes:
The two weeks that the econom ists spent before the j ury represented the lengthiest testimony except for that of the Hunts themselves. The economist exp ert w itnesses addressed all the key aspects of any civil case, namely the nature of the offense, the defendants' intent to commit the offense, the causal connection between the defendants' actions and the damage to the plaintiff, and the monetary valuation of that damage. The economists spoke to the " ultimate issue" : Did the Hunts manipulate the silver market?" 68 At the end, Judge Morris E. Lasker had few doubts in determining that the Hunts and their allies were the cause of the skyrocket pricing pattern observed. Prior to the Hunt Brothers' episode, it was thought that the si lver market was too large to be manipulated, but this decision showed that the Hunts accomplished what previously had been thought to be not feasible.
Turning from s ilver to copper, Gilbert suggests that when searching for manipulation "one may look for distortions in the futures price structure (ie the term structure of futures prices) which arc not explicable in terms of seasonality." 69 Backwardation, defined as a negative value for the difference between the futures price of a contract and the cash price for the same commodity, has been identified as potentiall y indicative of manipulation. Though backwardation can never be conclusive evidence of manipulation, "if a market becomes a bnormally prone to move into backwardation, manipulation may be presumed. " 70 Unde r backwardation, there tends to be a high basi s (structure) variability resulting in a poorer 67. WILLI AMS,SIIpra note 14, at 100-60.
68. !d. at 12. 69. Gilbert, s upra note 22, at 6; see also Russo, s upra note 39 § 12-23, ("Although the maximum price difference for more distant months over nearby months is a virn1al certainty, the reverse is not always the case. When a severe sh011age of deliverable commodities exists, whether for natural reasons or because the market prices are being manipulated, the arbitraging activ ities of commercial users described above are inhi bited and the cash and nearby futures trade at premi ums over subsequent dclivc1y months."). Note that such a co nvention only applies to non-perishable conunoditics.
70. Gi lbe11, s upra note 22, at 7.
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REVOLUTION IN MANIPULATION LAW 375 quality hedge. Of course, other circumstances could cause high volatility in prices and consequent backwardation. lt follows that if stocks (supplies) are sufficiently available, backwardation would be unexpected. Gilbert states that onl y under these circumstances wo uld highly variable backwardation be indicative of manipulation. Vice versa, " it is difficult to distinguish attempted manipulations from successful speculation in a bull markct."
71
Gilbert uses the Sumitomo episode regard ing an alleged manipulation of copper in the 1990's on the London Metal Exchange (LME) to conclude that an observed stark backwardation in the futures term structure is potentially indicative of manipulation. 72 In the case of Sumitomo, manipulation was alleged to have lasted for a period of over six years, and the CFTC also alleged that backwardation was so extensive and longlasting on the LME that copper supplies moved from the COMEX warehouse in Ari zona to the LME ware house in Californ ia. 73 Furthcm1orc, the CFTC argued that arbitrage h·ading and other factors linked trading of copper on the COMEX with that on the LME and S umitomo's activ ity caused the upward manipulation of copper futures prices on the COMEX.
74
T hus, distmtion of prices can, under certain conditions, spread to other markets or to other exchanges, which should be considered in a comparative pri ce analysis.
[ntcnt
Although some scholars argue that the harms of manipulation are sufficiently indicative of such be havior that they wanant remedy even absent a demonsh·ated intention to manipulate/ 5 it is clear that manipulation liability is never incurred unintentionally. 76 Impmtantly, manipulation does not occur by simply trading in a manner that a ffects the price. The scienter requirement articulated in in re Indiana Farm Bureau makes clear that more is required: " the intent requirement, which is the same for a manipulation and an attempted manipulation, is ' the performance of an act or conduct which was intended to effect an artificial 7 1. G ilbert, supra note 22, at 9. 72. Gi lbert, supra note 22, at 7-10. 76. See Markha m, supra note I, at 284 (observing that " the govenunent and the courts have engrafted an in tent requirement onto the prohibition against manipulation, requi ring a showing that the trader intended to c reate an arti ficial price").
U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JO URNAL OF BUSfNESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 price. "' 77 That is, scienter in manipulation law is intent as to the artificial price c lement. The Cargill court concluded that "[t]he aim must be ... to discover whether conduct has been intentionally engaged in w hich has resulted in a price which does not reflect basic forces of s upply and demand. " 78 A requirement of intentio n is imp01tant because it is widely believed that some atTangcments with manipulative effects can occur by accident. For example, a market actor may buy a quantity of futures as well as the underlying commod ity, and then the supply of the underlying commodi ty may decline for unrelated reasons. She would find herself with a ri ght to demand deli very from countcrparties while, quite innocently, she owns much of the existing stock of the commodity. The law rega rds this accidental corner quite differently from one that the trade r intentionally effected. In Great Western Food Distributors v. Brannan, 79 which concerned manipulation of the market price of refrigerated eggs, the court declared th at "the intent of the parties during their h·ading is a determinative element of a punishable corner" and tmintentional corners should not catTy the same penalties. 80 Simi larly, in Volkart Brothers v. Freeman, the Fifth Circuit, considering a squeeze in the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, recognized that squeezes may be mere congestions and thus, it must be proven "that [the respondents] intentionally brought about the squeeze by planned action ."
81
If intent were not required, many accidental h·ansactions would be subject to liability. 82 Although specific intent is requi red under the CEA, courts have allowed proof by way of circumstantial evidence or by showing that the defendant had both the motive and the opportunity, as with securities fraud law. 83 Objecti ve econometric analysis therefore plays an important role in establishing subjective state of mind. For example, the Cargill court, considering unusual trading patterns at the end of a trading day, found that Cargi ll ' s " behavior in liquidating its contracts was c learly intentional and 83. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 11 67-70. Such inference of intent is in agreement with Perdue's definition of manipulation "as conduct that would be uneconomical or irrational, absent an effect on market price." Perdue, supra note 19, at 348. 20 13] R EVOLUT ION TN MAN IPULATION LAW 377 was hi ghly unusual market behavior; and the method of liquidating the unresolved open interest fo llowing the close of trading was also unusual and clearly conh·olled by Cargill ." 84 Inte nt was the best exp lanation for unusua l behavior.
Courts wi ll sometimes infer that actions taken contrary to apparent commercial interest a re indicative o f intention to manipulate. The notion of commercial interest was a lso addressed in In re Sumitomo, where traders fo r Sumitomo " acquired and maintained a dominant and controlling position in both the physical suppl y of deliverable LME warehouse stocks and in maturing LME futures positions." 85 The -This is typicall y combined w ith appropriate analysis to exclu~c leg~tunate reasons for such actions, which is both a key legal dtmcnston of manipulation law and one in dire need of economic analysis to be properly conducted. Finally, Russo observes that a long who takes advantage of a natural squeeze in supply " by standing for delivery can rightfully be said to fh . h 
D. Manipulation is Hard to Prove
Over the last several decades, the CFTC has not s uccessfully ~rosccutcd a meaningful number of manipulation cases. 94 Many agree that 1ts lack of success in litigation has been due in great part to the fact that in order to establish manipulation, the CFTC was required to prove the intent to create an artificial price, that prices were in fact artificial, and that they were caused by the alleged manipulator. As one scholar has noted:
[U]nder present law the crime of manipulation is virtually unpr.osecu.tablc, a~d remedies for those injured by price mampulatron are d1fficult to obtain. Moreover, even where a prose~ution is successful, the investigation and effmi necessary to brmg a case wi ll involve years of work, enormous expenditures, as well as an extended trial. 95 The difficulty of proving manipulation as a conceptual matter has been d iscus~ed above, but its practical difficulti es are best illustrated by the financia l market's most shocking contemporary manipulation-Libor.
Libor
Libor has been called "the world's most important number," 96 and it dominates the interest-rate swap market 97 and syndicated loan market, 9 R and 94. Dissatisfaction with the CFTC has been noted by members of Congress and in case law. See, e.g. , Commodity Futures Improvements Act of 199 I: Hearing on H.R. 707, 1 02nd Cong. 212 ( 199 1); 135 CONG. REc. H5603 , H5613 (daily ed. Sep t. 13, 1989) (statement of Rep. Long). (" I feel that we should do all that we can to ensure that the CFTC play a more act1ve ro le 1n regulating the exchanges ... . "); Am. Agri c. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. o f Trade ofCI~i., 9?7 F.~d 1147, 1166 (7th C ir. 1992) ("[T)he amend ment was motivated in large pa 1 t by dJssahsfactJOn w1tb the Commiss ion 's fa ilure to take vigorous action in this very case . . .. A separate provision in both bills furth er refl ects Congress' view that the Commi ssion's supervision has been less than adequate.").
95. Markham, supra note I, at 28 1; Pin·ong, wpra note 17 , at 60 ("The reasoning in several cases makes it virtually impossible to meet any of these three standards, Jet alone all three simultaneously." Three theories are often discussed with respect to the alleged motive of the banks in this matter. The first is a rcputational theory, according to which several of the panel banks attificially depressed the price of Libor by submitting fa lsely low quotes, in order to preserve their reputations during the earl y days of the financial crisis. Submitting a quote to the BBA that showed a very high borrowing cost in the interbank market might indicate that the market is unsure of that bank's creditworthiness, which could result in worsening financing prospects. No bank wanted to be the next Lehman Brothers or Bear Steams, so each had an incenti ve to lowball their Libor quote. Libor itself would consequenti ally end up too low.
The reputational theory seems to be the most well-known, having been the subject of the Wall Street Journal arti cle that brought the possibility of a Libor disruption to public attention, 105 but plaintiffs in the various lawsuits generally rely on a different theory. They posit that the panel banks were motivated by a desire to extort wealth fi·om their customers. This extractive theory points to the fact that a disruption in the Libor would result in large wealth transfers, benefiting or harming anyone who had a non-zero net exposure to Libor. If Libor were artificially lowered, those who owed money on loans written to Libor would owe less to their lenders than before. Contracts that are settled in terms of Libor would be lower in : alue. For exampl e, the CME Eurodollar futures contract settlement pri ce ts. defined as one hundred minus Libor, 106 so that a fow· percentile drop in Ltbor would result in a four percentile drop in settlement value to the purchaser.
The panel banks bonow or lend at Libor, and they may take positions 111 the Eurodollar contract market, but the most important means of I 04. The Basics, BBA Lt l:lOR, supra note I 00. 105. Moll enkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7. I 06 . . Eurodollar Futures, CME GROUP, h ttp://www.emegroup.com/trad ing/i nterestratcs/stlr/euroclo llar_ contract_spec ifications.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2 0 13).
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REVOLUTION TN MANIPULAT ION LAW 381 extraction would have been by way of interest rate swaps. Interest rate swaps arc a mass ive market approachi ng $450 trillion dollars in notional valuc, 107 in which the fo urteen largest dealers are a party to eighty-two percent of the h·ansactions by value. Libor panel banks arc among the largest swap dealers in the world . 10~ L nterest rate swaps allow corporations, commercial banks, and other entities to manage their interest rate risk. For example, the C ity of Baltimore has entered into many swaps in which it pays a fixed rate and receives Libor. One 2003 swap bas the city paying 4.97% to their counterparty and receiving the one-month Libor ratc.
109 This $17 million swap makes the city better off when interest rates rise, which is intended to help the city cope with its floating rate bonds, which become more expensive as interest rates rise.
In a typical interest rate swap , one party pays a fi xed amount and the other pays an amount linked to a varying rate such as Libor. Generally, derivati ves deal ers will h·y to have somethi ng like a balanced position, offering a floating rate in one contract and receiving a floating rate in another. That way they are not caught off-guard by the vagaries of interest rate changes. Yet, by intentional trading or by accident, imbalances in position can occur. And if a bank were to be a Libor payer more than a L ibor receiver, it would benefi t from Libor's decline. In the case of the City of Baltimore, a decline in the Libor rate would reduce Baltimore's payment from its counterparty while its fixed-rate obli.gation remaine? constant. 110 Tf Baltimore's counterparty had no other Ltbor exposure, tt would have accrued wealth from the manipulation. The extraction theory, offered by the pl aintiffs of In re Libor, 111 as wel l as the economists Youle and Snider, 112 holds that banks offered false Libor quotes in order to exploit the fact that they had robust net positions on Libor.
A final theory is related to the extraction theory, but it does not imagine long-tenn and large positions on a bank 's balance sheet. Rather, the trading theory suggests that a bank may have engaged in trading that was infonned by their knowledge of future Libor changes, or that they may have changed Libor to benefit short term trading positions. This theory is closer to ordinary insider trading. No vocal proponent has endorsed this view, though it docs fit the tone of al legations against a recently dismissed trader from the Royal Bank of Scotland's Singapore office. Tan Chi Min alleges in his wrongful termination suit that it was common practice for senior bank employees to request that RBS seck to influence the Libor rate to profit their own positions as well as those of the banks. 11 3 One could imagine traders treating Libor as their secret weapon to make sure that Eurodollar futures trades work out well more often than they should.
This last example underscores an impo1tant point: If any manipulation occtuTed, it may or may not have had institutional approval. Tan claims that it was RBS ' s practice to influence the Libor, but his emp loyer claims that Tan was fired for improperly influencing Libor on his own initiative. On any theory, a manipulation might have been perpetrated by a rogue trader or executive rather than with the full approval of the board of directors.
Nonetheless, even the lone wolf theory in which a trader acts alone calls into question a bank's internal controls. Regulators in Japan recently sanctioned Citigroup and UBS because their employees attempted to improperly, and repeatedly, influence the Tibor (the Tokyo equiva lent of the Libor).
114
The Japanese SecUiities and Exchange Surveillance Conunission said that the banks lacked internal controls to prevent rate manipulation. 115 Barclays' non-prosecution agreement included lurid descriptions of traders and rate-setters, sitting nearby one another or cozily agreeing to cooperate. 116 The FSA's subsequent investigation concluded that "[t]hcre are wealmesses in govemancc arrangements for the compilation process, and within contributing banks thcmselves. "
117
The resu lt of potential manipulation could be monumental. Consider We discuss in a later section some of the means used to screen for potential manipulation and conspiracy in this market. The immcdiate~y following section goes on to show the challenges that would be ex~ccted. m bringing a suit against the panel banks under pr~-Dod~-Fra~ mampulation law even if the allegations were true. lf the L1bor d1srupt1on represented manipulation, the pre-Dodd-Frank CEA would be ill-equipped to remedy the manipulation. Before Dodd-Frank, manipulation law required proof of pnce artificiality and the defendant's intention. These are difficult clements to prove, and they arc particularly difficult with a financial instrumentality like Libor. Below, we apply these elements to Libor with a focus on the role of economic analysis.
a) Artificiality
Notwithstanding the longstanding use of empirical investigation in manipulation cases, described in I.C., supra, adjudicators have sometimes tied their hands by being hostile to econometric means of proving ·fi · 1 . 123 arh ICta 1ty.
Indiana Farm Bureau provides a particularly clear example. 124 Although a 30% price jump on the last day of corn trading was enough to persuade two Commissioners of price manipulation, the majority dismissed the use of cash-futures price comparisons. 125 The result has been a very high standard ofproofwith very little means of realistically atta ining it.
126
However, some scholars have concurred in skepticism about the possibility of inferring artificiality from a benchmark of comparable prices. 127 .
These problems become vastly more difficult when confronting mterest rates rather than eggs. If 30% price jumps in eggs are Lmimportant to a court, then some very profitable manipulations will fly below the court's radar.
One reason concerns scale. For many commodity and swap transactions, the profits reaped from manipulation could be great even when the relative scale of manipulation is small. The notional value indexed to Libor approaches $400 trillion. A tiny change in Libor produces 123. See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 50 (examining existing decisions which have restricted the usc of econometric means in proving manipulation).
124. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. J\ss' n, Inc., [ 1982 -1984 126. See Pirrong, supra note 50, at 959 (explaining that "current precedents make it cxlremely difficul t to find a trader guilty of manipulation even in cases in which the economic analysis suggests that the trader has indeed manipulated").
127. See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at 1262 ("It seems fa ir to say that no two futures contracts behave identi cally, and even when similar futures ex ist, they may be occaswned by qwtc different market conditions or j udgments."); Lower, supra note I, at 394-96; McDcm1ott, supra note 15; Perdue, supra note 19, at 373-80; Van Smith, supra note 25. lf Libor were to L' nove down thirty basis points, or 0.3%, Libor payers in aggregate would see their liabilities drop by more than $1 trillion per year. [f large banks were net payers on Libor, a great deal of this would inure to their benefit. If for exampl e, a bank were a payer of Libor on 10% of the world's i~tcrest rate swaps by value, and a payee of Libor on 9% of the world's interest rate swaps, their net exposure would be I% of the world 's notional value or $4 trillion. Paying 0.3% less on that $4 tri ll ion exposure would make' the bank's share of the misa llocation exceed $10 bill ion annually, which is a very attractive return that could be caused by a relatively small manipulation.
These back-of-the-envelope estimates arc wi~hin the ballpark of the banks ' own guesses. Citi in 2009 reported that It woul.d make $936 in net interest revenue if interest rates dropped twenty-five baSIS points per quatter for one ycar. 129 T hese grad~1al changes. arc a :raction of the magnitude of the sudden price changes d1sregardcd 111 Indwna Farm Bureau. An exh·active manipulation could be vastly profitable and yet within the realm of statistical error, and well below the th reshold a court might demand.
. The relative profits could be even greater on a tradrng thcmy. lf a trader could consistently guess the tiny movements in Libor, or cause them in advance of a h·ade, then each h·ade could be marginally more profitable. With many trades per day, a bank's proprietary trading desk could leverage an insi ght of tlu·ee basis points into millions of dollars in a day.
130
Courts cannot assume that a manipulation large enough to tempt manipulators will also be large enough for demonstratio~ in court. Indeed, profitable manipulations may be so small that they are d1fficult to de~cct at all. Once discovered, it may be hard to show that a small change 111 the price was not the result of c~ance or so~c other cause.; therefore, materiality of the alleged behavtor may be difficult to establish. Unlc~s reliable means can be used to fmd and locate the causes of true changes 111 the price of a swap or commodity, detection and proof will be rare and spotty.
b) Intent is Hard to Prove
For a plaintiff alleging manipulation, proving the defendants' intent 128. See Mollcnkamp, Libor Fog, supra note 7 (rep01ting that an analyst at Citi suggested that Libor was thirty basis points too low).
129. Citi FormY-9C.
130. This activity could be aided by fast-trading hedge fund~. Se.e Binham .~tal. , supra note 113 (noting that hedge funds "place big bets on movements 111 [L1bor) rates ).
U. OF P ENNSYLVAN IA JOURNA L OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 entails clearing many hurdles. Intent is a subjective state, w hich is not al ways readil y demonstrable. While courts accept circ umstantial evidence of intent from behavior, that behavior is often explicable w ithout any intent, bedeviling the demonstration of the requisite scienter. If the investor has legitimate reasons for taking an action, then no manipulative intent can be concluded. 131 As the judicial officer noted in In re Kosuga, "[d]rawing a line between legitimate trading and trading with manipulative intent is sometimes a very difficult task. " 132 Since a small manipulation can still have a big impact, the trade or quote will not be far from what others would expect anyway.
It is always difficult to litigate mental states, but the legal bm·dens of demonstrating intent arc exacerbated by certain features of financial law and financial markets because these industries promote the evaporation of typical forms of evidence of scienter. The Supreme Court has noted that " banking is a highly regulated industry," 133 and the more highly regulated an industry, a nd the more claims that are brought aga inst participants in it, the likelier they are to avoid the sort of (electronic) paper trail to which plaintiffs have traditionally turned in seeking evidence of intent. For example, fmancial professionals now know that when matters become sufficiently problematic, they should call one anothe r-on their personal cell phones-making smoking gun c-mails increasingly rare.
The in re Libor defendants may have left some documentary evidence The BBA excludes the top and bottom quatiile of bank quotes, so that if any individual bank provides a " too low" or a "too high" L ibor quote, it will be excluded by the determining group and hence will not directly influence the Libor. Yet 131 . in re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass' n, Inc., (1982) (1983) (1984) Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CC I-!)~ 2 1,796 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982) ("In the absence of evidence that respondents were respons ible for the market congestion, it cannot be inferred that respondents' trading activity, cons istent with their hedging program and commercial commitments, was intended to produce an artificial price. Standing for delivery as they d id was respondents' contractual right and was motivated by the pre-existing commercial needs and the UJ1Celta inty o f price in the inactive cash market. Unlike Cargill, Indiana Fam1
Bureau did not deplete the local cash commod ity late in the delivery month; did not establish a large long specu lati ve position at a time it knew it held virtually all of the cash commodity; and did not increase its long position on the last day of trad ing . Nor d id it liquidate a dominant speculative long position at prices already seven to eight cents over th e market."). . anangement of at least five banks would certainly affect the Libor. For example, if the five banks provide " too low" quotes, lower than all other banks, the bottom four will be excluded, but the fifth from the bottom wi ll be included and wi ll manipulate the Libor downwards. If a manipulative cat1el forms, as investigators become increasingly convinced occmTed, it becomes likely that evidence of their coordination can be found to corroborate intent.
Yet, the levels of collusion req uired to manipulate Libor arc lower than it may seem. Under some circumstances, a s ing le ind iv idual can unilaterall y affect the Libor rate.
135 Although outlier quotes are excluded, a bank that moves the included middle of the pack closer to the outer qua11ile may affect the average, and any bank that arrives in the excluded outer quartile may push in another quote that would have previously been excluded; even banks excluded from the computation of Libor can affect it through fa lse submissions, since it may cause other bank quotes which would not have belonged to the gro up of eight quotes entering in the Libor computation to be counted. This is the indirect way in which even excluded banks may be able to affect Libor. 136 Thus, a ll banks in the panel may unilatera ll y affect the average by moving the quote in at least one direction. 137 Collusion would make the scheme much easier, but even small collusive arrangements could have a meaningful impact for the conspiring parties. Perhaps this is why government investigators have focused on small conspiracies, often a request from a trader at a bank to a colleague working for a voice broker, rather than industry-wide cartels. Not only is intent required to prove manipulation, but also the threshold for demonstrating intent, even at a motion to dismiss stage, is extremely demanding. As the S upreme CoUJt has put it, "[ e ]xacting p leading requirements are among the control measures Congress included in the PSLRA [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act]. The [Act] requires plaintiffs to state with particularity ... the facts evidencing scienter, i.e. , the defendant's intention .... " 140 This includes, under the PSLRA, that plaintiffs establish " with patticularity facts giving rise to a stTong inference that the defendant acted w ith the required state of mind." 141 In Te/labs, the Supreme Cmut clarified what a strong inference is, stating that " [t]o qualify as 'strong' within the intendment of § 2 1 D(b )(2) . . . an inference of scie nter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." 142 The law thus establishes unusually challe nging evidentiary burdens for the demonstration of intent in two primary contexts of frnancial manipulation: securities and commodities transactions.
Problems of Scope
Problems of proof are by now fam iliar.
Many profitable manipulations were hard to prove under the CEA, including-if it occun·ed-Libor manipulation. More importantly, the CEA simply did not purport to cover many transactions that were o f great importance. For example, ifLibor were manipulated, its greatest impact would be felt in the massive interest rate swap market. Despite frequent efforts by the CFTC to assert jurisdiction, 143 the Congress amended the CEA to be clear that it did 139. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 ( 1976) 144 In the pre-Dodd-Frank days when much of the Libor manipulation is alleged to have taken place, 145 Libor-rclatcd swaps would not have been el igible for redress under the CEA. CEA manipulation might still be alleged for exchange-traded derivatives, such as Eurodollar future contracts, but CEA manipulation law was unequipped to remedy such man ipulation , even if it _were a~cquatcly proved. One reason is that the specific intent clcm~nt IS not snnply an evidentiary problem of how to show that a defendant rntcnded to. creat~ an artificial price. lt is a legal standard that actually excuses mampulatwns whe re the defendant recklessly created an artificial price while intentionally engaging in some other opprobrious conduct, but did not specifically intend to create the artificial price.
Consider the reputation account of Libor manipulation , in which banks arc alleged to have submitted false Libor quotes for no reason other than protecting their reputation. 146 The quote sub~itter may not be attempting to injure any particular party. She may not llltend to aff~ct the price of a commodity or security. That i _s a byproduct, b_arely constdcred, of her desire to protect the bank's reputation. She may thmk that her quote will be an outl ier from the pack and so excluded from the average and have negligible impact on the Libor rate. Similarly, even if her ~~ote is_ likel~ to influence Libor and so the values of many assets and postttons, mclud mg those of her fu~, she may not have given any thought to the rela~ionship between Libor and those other assets. Her exclusive concern wtth firm reputation may be reckless, to be sure, but may lack specific intent to cause an artificial price for a swap or commodity.
. To go fu rther, the quote submitter may not even know that the quo_t~ ts fa lse. Libor is quoted in several currenci es and tenors per day. ln addttton to popular tenors like the U.S. Dol lar (USD) three-month Libor, it also includes surveys of seven-month Swedish Krona borrowlllgs. Each day the bank is to provide its unsecured rate for borrowing Swedish Krona for seven months in London. Yet the bank may not have borrowed any Swedish Krona in that duration in London that day, 147 disallow the bank to simply take a USD rate and apply a foreign exchange convers ion to it.
H
The BBA asks for data the banks do not reall y have. The bank must devise some process to answer the question and that process may be good or bad, forthright or opportunistic, but intentionally false and manipulative would be harder to say. This is not just a problem for obscure currencies.
The most important L ibor to swap and loan participants is undoubtedly the three-month Libor. It is the basis of the majmity of subprime mortgages, among other assets. 149 Yet banks borTow very little at the three-month duration any more.
Seventy percent of interbank tra nsactions arc overnight, and ninety-five percent are for one month or less.
150
Thus the world's most important benchmark is set from some of the thirmest markets. In the context of thin trading, it is harder for treas urers to report patently false quotes and easier for them to recklessly allow a quote that happens to be helpful to the bank. The problems c reated by thin markets are not unique to particular currencies or tenors. Suppose a bank gets a cheap loan from the government at a subsidized rate, or a loan from a creditor hoping to protect the borrower's reputation. Should th e treasurer include this unusual loan in its assessment of the day 's borrowing costs? BBA can help to clarify these issues, 151 but until it does, there is ambiguity about what counts as the bank's borrowing cost. A treasurer that interprets ambiguity in whichever way benefits her bank may be reckless with the truth, but it is hard to say that there is a specific intent to manipulate. Even if intentionally misleading quotes were offered with the knowledge that they could affect ar1ificial commodity prices, it is not clear that they would fit under the CEA intention element. The CEA does not require a profit motive for the manipulation. 152 Nor need the manipulator the currencies/ maturities they quote and so it would not be feas ible to create a full suite of LlBOR rates if this was a requirement.").
148. Defi nitio ns, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/definitions ( last visited Jan. 30, 20 13). 
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IT. MANIPULATION AFTER D ODD-FRI\NK.: UNFTNTSHED
In the aftermath of the largest global financial crisis since the Great D epression, and in the face of ongoing financial scandals discussed earlier in this Article, the CFT C adopted new anti-manipulation rules of potent generali ty and breadth. Ln tllis Part, subpart (A), we overview the new statutory law and regulations and analyze their legal implications. Subpart (B) shows that the new rules may be read as responsive to many of the concems in Part T. The standards o f proof and scope have been adjusted to cover more potential manipulations, including the alleged Libor manipulation. But that does not end the discussion. Subpart (C) shows the changes to CEA manipu lation law must be taken to precipitate a change in the technology used in consideration of manipulation. Although it may seem that Dodd-Frank and its implementing regulations reduce the need for complex empiri cal analysis because it eases the challenge of showing specific intent and artificiality, in fact the legal system must become more attentive to econometric techniques than ever. This is in part because of the factors that D odd-Frank and the new rules do not address: initial detection, establishing damages causation and recklessness, and pleading standards. Each of these items remains the subject of intense empirical interest, to a degree only highlighted by the new rules. U. OF PENNSYLVAN IA JOURNAL OF BUSTNESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 elements of the manipulation offense does not by itself end the difficult inquiries that frustrated manipulation before: Complicated factual analyses will still be necessary to detect and plead manipu lation, as well as to establish da mages. Without empirical support the law will either be toothless or else excessive. Though the new rules address many of the difficulties with the CEA 's manipulation regime, the reforms are unfinished if they are implemented through rules a lone. They require thorough empirical analysis by courts and parties.
A. Explication ofLaw
The authority for the CFTC's new anti-manipulation regulations is section 753 of Dodd-Frank, which amends section 6(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act.
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Three amendments and their implementing rules arc consequential here. F irst, section 6(c)(3) extends traditional market power manipulation prohibitions to cover swaps, and clarifies that in tent will suffice where the manipulation was unsuccessful: " It sha ll be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity . ... " 156 Final Rule 180.2 implements the provision: " [l]t shal l be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the pticc of any swap, or of any commodi ty in interstate conunercc, or for future delivery on or s ubject to the rules of any registered entity. " 157 T he Commission has expressed its intent to continue to be guided by the four-part test for pricemanipulation arising under the previous CEA section 6(c) and CEA section 9(a)(2). As previously explained, based on Russo and extensive case law, the four components are: (1) the accused had the ability to influence market prices and (2) the intent to create or affect prices not reflecting legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) artificial prices existed and (4) the accused caused such artificia l prices. 158 For attempted manipulation cases, there are only two requisites: the intent and an overt act in furtherance of that intent. Thus, section 6(c)(3) modestly bolsters attempt liability and brings swaps into the market power manipulation regime.
The other two amendments create, for the first time, a fraud-based manipulation scheme under the CEA, and in so doing import vast case law from the federal securities regime. Section 6( c)(l) now declares that: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to usc or employ, or 155. 7 U.S.C. § § 9, 15 (20 12 attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or .contrivance." 159 Section 6(c)( l )(A) extends the scope of section 6(c)'s primary prohibition, including within the reach of unlawful manipulation, delivering "a fa lse or misleading or inaccurate report concerning ... market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity ... knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that I . f: I . I d.
. " 160 I h d . c sue 1 report JS .a sc, nus ca mg or maccurate. n ot er wor s, tt wcuses on manipulation effected through fa lse reporting.
Rule 180. 1 implements these amendments. 161 It prohibits fraud and fraud-based manipulation as wel l as attempted fraud or manipulation by any person, acting intentionally or recklessly, directly or indirectly, in connection with any swap, cash, or futures contract. Examples of conduct forbidden under rule 180.1 include:
Us [ing] or cmploy[ing], or attcmpt[ing] to use or employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; Mak[ing], or attempt[ing] to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a matetial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or misleading; Engag[ing], or attempt[ing] to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person ... [Knowingly or recklessly] dcliver [ing] or caus[ing] to be delivered ... by any means of conununication ... a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of d .
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any conuno 1ty .... -This new rule differs from pre-Dodd-Frank rules in live important ways. First, it extends to swaps. Second, in contrast w ith pre-Dodd-Frank cases, in which the Commission had to establish that the fraud was in connection with a swap or cash or futures contract made, or to be made for, on behalf of, or wi th the victim of the fraud, rule 180.1 contains no similar limitation. Third, wh ile the new law allows trading on nonpublic market infmmation obtained in the usual course of business, material nonpublic market information obtained tlu·ough fraud or deception or in the breach of a pre-existing duty may not be used unless disclosed. This brings an insider trading rule akin to the sccw·itics regime's misappropriation theory 159. !d. § 9(1). to commodities and swaps. Fourth, rule 180. 1 relaxes two key elements of manipulation claims: artificiality and intention. It expands the scienter standard to include reckless behavior, which may be s ufficient by itself without the specific intent to defraud or manipulate.
Finally, it is evident from the statutory language (and the language of the final regulations themselves), that the anti-manipulation rules import the language, and hence, presumably the case law of securities fraud under section I O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) and SEC Rule IOb-5 , codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 163 The lega l implications oftbe 180.1 anti-manipulation rules are vast, and it is clear from the language and scope of the regulations that their drafters intended to have the kind of impact on the trading of commodities that Rule I Ob-5 has had on the securities markets. 164 It may even go further: Section 6( c) encompasses attempt, unlike section I Ob of the SEA, and lacks Rule lOb-S 's requirement of a purchase or sale. The implications of these rules arc enormous, but our focus is on their interaction with cases of complex potential financial manipulation. Depending on the species of manipulation, sections 180. l (a)(l), (2), (4) and section 180.2 are all p ertinent.
B. Application to In re Libor
The new provisions seem responsive to some of the challenges for pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation law, and so provide a means to address alleged Libor manipulation. With rule 180.2, CFTC intends to extend its four-element price manipulation standard into this new rule, subjecting swaps for the first time to this liability scheme. 165 Much of the Libordependent market includes exchange-traded and OTC swaps. The new rules clearly bring these into the fold.
Rule 180.2 also covers attempted manipulations. This may prove essential to covering cases where the manipulation was ineffective, and so did not create an a11ificial price. For an example from the alleged Libor 
2013]
REVOLUTION fN M AN IPULATION LAW 395 manipulation, a bank that is already in the excluded qua~til~ might submit a false quote that is even fmthcr into the excluded qumt1le 1n a~1 attempt to influence the Libor rate. This attempt wou ld be unsuccessful smcc the rate would not change as a result of this quote. However, the activity is the type of conduct that many would agree should be proscribed. The attempt prong may be essential to prosecuting a panel bank whose quotes fall ~utside the mean-shaping quotes for the critical pe1;od and thus, arguably, IS not part of the eight quotes that shape the mean and generate Libor's value. T he rules also specifica lly contemplate attempt liability for an employee who orders a subord inate to make a fraudulent misstatement, but has that order rebuffed. 166 They thus promote robust intemal controls. The Commission 's authority is extended with respect to pre-Dodd Frank rules through its prohibition of manipulation and attc~npt~d manipulation that is either direct or indirect. It expects to exercise tts authority "where the fraud or manipulation has the potential to affcc~ cash . . . h k t 167 commodity futures, or swaps markets or pat11Clpants 1n t cse mar e s.
Rule 180.1 creates new types of manipulation liability with largely different standards. The key inclusion of "recklessly" in the section 180. 1 definition of scienter is thought to substantially case the speci fie intent rcquiTement. The Commission defines recklessness as "an act or. o~1ission that 'departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that tt IS very difficult to beli eve the actor was not aware of what he or she was
doing. "' 16~
This certainly eases the burden of proving manipulation. Although intent can be proved by external evidence, it is a subjective state. On the other hand, recklessness is fundamental ly a standard of conduct that requires judgments about what information an actor should have h~d and what results she should have anticipated, regardless of whether she m fact acquired that information or intended any particular result.
More interestingly, a recklessness standard seems to capture many of the hitherto elusive manipul ations that rnight have oCCUlTed in the Libor disruption . For examp le, the reputation theory h~s it t~1at Libor. is manipulated as an indirect result of the direct and s~ec!f'ic d~SII'~ to p~·ov1~e a submission quote that protects the banks' reputatiOn. Artificial pnces rn loans, swaps, and Eurodollar futures arc a more indirect result still. lt is not clear that a trader who did not think at all about those results would have had the specific intent requirement for CEA manipulation under the pre- 166. Jd. at41 ,403. 167. /d. at41,401 (emphasis added). 168. td. at 41,404 (quoting Drexel Burnham Lambc1t Tnc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. C ir. 1988) ). Recall also that many tenors of Libor are thin ly traded and so provide the bank officer little evidence either way on what the appropriate Libor quote should be. Here, it is hard to establish specific manipulative intent because the officer can hardly be said to have offered a quote that she knows to be fal se. If there were no loans at all made at that tenor, and there have been none in a while, bow can a particular number be assuredly incorTect? Rather, she is simply being reckless by offering a quote that she has no good reason to think true, and it would seem to fall below a standard of ordinary care to give a quote that is not the fruit of a diligent infmmation-gathering process. S imilarly, suppose a bank determined that it would use a different methodology every day to determine its Libor quote, sel ecting whichever yields the lowest quote. It is unlikely that this calculation method amounts to a specific intentional manipulation as such, but it probably yields reckless quotes.
The new rules also bring CEA enforcement to areas of overlap between the Commodities Exchange Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and Antitrust laws. Man y times, violations of the CEA are also violations of the SEA or of the Sherman A ct. For example, security-based swaps are under the jurisdiction of both the SEC and the CFTC. Similarly, some manipulati ve or fraudulent schemes may cover a variety of security and commodity assets. Some defendants may already be liable under the SEA. Yet al lowing claims under the CEA that parallel the SEA is not mere superfluity because the CEA authorizes a wider range of defendants than does the SEA.
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 169 the Supreme Court limited liability under section lO(b) of the SEA and mle 1 Ob-5 to only " primary" perpetrators of fraud. 170 The Court ruled that there is no private right of action against secondary actors such as lawyers, inveshnent bankers, and accountants who may have facilitated the fraud but did not personally make a fa lse or mislead ing claim. against secondary actors. 173 T hus, where an acti vity violates both the SEA and the CEA, such as a fra ud that concerned both swaps and securities or of security-based-swaps where the CFTC and SEC have overlapping jurisdiction, secondary actors who arc not liable under the SEA may sti ll be subj ect to suit under the CEA. The arri val of CEA manipulation to the realm of swaps and security-based swaps increases the degree of vicarious liability.
With rules implementing Dodd-Frank's anti-manipulation provisions, the U.S. is now a leader in both civil and criminal enforcement capacity for manipulation of financial indices and benchmarks, with regulators around the world taking the Libor d isruption as an opportunity to decide whether they too should implement rules akin to Dodd-Frank's. 174 
C. The Dangers of Dodd-Frank: Market Manipulation and Tnlervention
It may seem that these new regulations solve problems and reduce the need for expert economic analysis in adjudication. Y ct, they require empiri cal supp01t to strengthen and temper their potential.
The other side of powerful rules is the dangers of overdeterrcnce and mistargeted prosecution . Ru le 180.1 suits predicated on recklessness allow plaintiffs to avoid the marked difficulties of demonstrating intent or artificiality.
The downside of this elimination, however, is that recklessness opens the door to the prosecution of innocent (though complicated) economic behavior. This is particularly important at the pleading stage, where it may appear that vastly more plaintiffs will be able to survive a motion for summary judgment even where their claims arc baseless. The new rules underline the importance of well-employed 793, 793 (2009) ("[T] t was widely believed that [Stoneridge] limited the abil ity o f securities class action plainti ffs to bring claims aga inst secondary actors, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, w ho did not themselves make any fa lse or misleading statements."). I 73. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)( l ) (20 I 2) ("Any person (other than a registered entity or registered futures association) who vio lates thi s chapter o r who willfu l~y aids, abets, counsels, induces, or procures the commission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable fo r actual damages . .. . ")(emp hasis added). I 74. See WH EATLEY RI:V IEW, supra note 11 7, at l I (urging greater enforcement powers for FSA); Gary Gensler, C hairman, U.S. Commodi ty Futures Trading Conun ' n, Transcri pt of O ral Remarks Before European Parl iament, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Brussels Belgium (Sept. 24, 20I2), available a/ hllp://www.c ftc.gov/ucm/g roups/public/@n ewsroom/documents/speechandtcstimony/opagensler-12 1.pdf (urging provisions similar to U. S. enforcement authority). U. OF P ENNSYLV /\N IA JO URN/\ L OF B USINESS L AW [Vol. 15: 2 economic analyses as an essential boundary to the new rulcs. 175 If economic tools can act as a buffer against the new rules, filtering out claims that implicate benign but complex swap transactions, it can lower the costs and reduce the fears of law-abiding swap market participants.
lii. PROPOSAL: E CONOMETRIC SCREENS
The new rules establish lower burdens in manipulation trial s, whi le not altering the actual difficulty of detecting manipulation, the difficulties of proving causation and damages, or the importance of crafting an appropriate pleading standard. This section describes some of the issues left unanswered by the new law, and alludes to the econometric technologi es that are needed to supplement the new law. It describes screen ing methodologies for detecting, proving, and dismi ssing alleged manipulation. We describe examples of these tlrree uses based on the professional experiences of one of the authors.
A. Screens for Detection
Regardless of how Dodd-Frank and its implemented rules adjusted the elements of manipulation, no claims will be brought if manipulation is not itself detected. The att of flagging potential unlawful behavior through economic and statistical ana lyses is commonly known as screening. 176 A screen is a statistical test based on an econometric model and a theory of the alleged illega l behavior, designed to identify whether manipulation, collusion, fraud or cheating of any kind may exist in a particular market. Screens use commonly available data such as pticcs, bids, quotes, spreads, Broadly speaking, the literature identifies two primary screening strategies. The first is to search for improbable events. Thi s type of screen is similar to looking for a "cheat" in a casino. For example, the probability that a gambler at a Las Vegas casino will place a winning be t in roulette on black or red is 47.37%. During a shift, a roulette dealer may sec a handful of players win five, or even seven, times in a row. However, the probability of winning twenty times in a row is around one in a million. If a pit boss observes such an occunence, he may not be able to prove that cheating has occurred, yet he would be well advised to watch the winner closely to avoid the risk of losing a significant amount of money. One set of collusive screens generalizes thi s idea by searching for events that arc, under normal conditions, improbable, unless agents in a market are cheating.
The second type of screen uses a control group. As an example, during the 1980s, one study found that the price of concrete was seventy percent higher in New York City than in other U.S. cities. ~i lc i~ is true that the prices of many goods and services arc somewhat higher m New York C ity, relative ly few of those prices are seventy percent higher than in other large cities. It was later established that an organized crime syndicate in New York City had been operating a concrete club that rigged bids on contr·acts over $2 million. Prices that arc anomalous, compared to other markets, suggest a lack of competition. . This section continues by describing (1) the usc of screens tn govcnunent investigations, and (2) the use of screens in detecting anomalies in Libor data.
I. Government Detection
Antitrust law has long been receptive to economic analyses, both in tetms of governmental regulation and judicial decision-making. This section seeks to give a quick recapitulation of these features in order to illuminate how commodities manipulation could similarly benefit. To begin with, seminal Supreme Colllt decisions have often cited economics 1 iteratme as support for the directions that antitmst law takes.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned against not conferring evidentiary weight on 177. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993) (citing economic analyses as support fo r claim that "[s]upracompetitive pricing entails a restriction in output").
U. OF P ENNSYLVAN IA JOURNA L OF BUSINESS L AW [Vol. 15:2 sound economic ana lyses. 17 & Economic analysis and empirical screening have had great success in triggering antitTUSt cases, including actions against an Italian cartel in the baby milk industry and a Dutch cartel in the slu-imp industry. Screens have also been used successfully to identify potential anti-competitive behavior in gasoline markets by the Federal Trade Commission, and to prioriti ze complaints in the Brazilian gasoline retai l market, leading to raids and the discovery of dispositive cvidence. 179 In Mexico, the competition authority has initially flagged a conspiracy in pharmaceutical markets through the use of bid-rigging screens, while in India screens were applied to detect a cement cartel. 18° Competition authorities worldwide are using empirical screens to detect anti-competitive behavior, including the FTC, the European Commi ssion, and competition authorities in The Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Africa. 181 Two different examples can illustrate the power of screens to detect anti-competitive behavior in financial markets. One is the recent stock options backdating and spring loading cases from the mid-2000's and the other is the 1994 break of an alleged conspiracy by NASDAQ dealers in which odd-eighths quotes were avoided. 182 B oth of these were triggered by the application of screens to fmancial data and generated large size investigations as well as private litigation. 178. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 ( 1962) (explaining that " [ i)n such cases, it becomes necessary to unde1takc an exa mination of var ious economic and historical factors in order to determine whether the arrangement under review is of the type Congress sought to proscribe"). States industry arc increasingly global in scope' and that ' events that dismpt finan cial markets and economies are often global in scope, require rapid regulatory response, and coordinated regulatory effort across international jurisdictions,' Congress expressed its view that the CFTC should 'continue to coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities, to participate in intcmational regulato1y organizations and forum s .... '"). The CFTC monitors trading and prices to screen for candidates that may warrant a closer look to detect potentia l illegal behavior. The Conunission 's monitoring and screening program uses several sources of market information. Some data are publicly available, such as data on overal l supply, demand, and marketing of the underlying commodity; also futures, options and cash prices, and trading volume. Other information may be highly confidential, and that includes data from exchanges, intermediaries, and large traders. As exchanges report daily positions and transactions of each clearing membe r to the Commission, those data may be analyzed as part of the screening cffmt. The data separately show proprietary and customer accounts and the aggregate position and trading volume of each clearing member in each futures and option contract. These can be used to quickly identify the firms clearing the largest buy or sell volu mes or holding the biggest positions in a particular market, though beneficial owners of the positions are not identifiable in these clearing data. As explained by the CFTC:
[The] market surveillance program is intc~dcd to preserve t~e economic functions of U.S. futures and optiOn markets under 1ts jurisdiction by monitoring trad ing activity:
• to detect and prevent manipulation or abusive practices, • to keep the Commission informed of s ignificant market developments, • to enforce Commission and exchange speculative position limits, and • to ensure compliance with Commission reporting requirements.
The market surveillance program's primary mission is to identify situations that could pose a threat of manipulation and to initiate appropriate preventive actions. Each day, for all active ~uturcs and option contract markets, the CFTC's market surve dl at~cc staff monitors the dail y activities of large traders, key pnce relationships, and relevant suppl y and demand factors in a continuous review for potential market problems. JHJ Price abctTations in the cash market for an underl ying fmancia l insh·ument may provide an opportunity for an attempted manipulation. CFTC staff monitors cash prices of the fi nancial instrument specified for delivery on the futures contract in relation to cash prices for nondeliverable insh·uments that are close, or identical substitutes, noting that when del iverable prices arc high relative to non-deliverable prices for U. OF P ENNSYLVANlA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 frnancia l instruments, it may flag the possibil ity to remove deliverable supplies from the futures market as part of an attempted manipulation.
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Additionally, the Commission explains that another flag for manipulative activity is when market participants take positions well beyond their financial capacity to take delivery or make settleme nt. The CFTC explains that it maintains open lines of communication with the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the SEC and other agencies, since several financial products involve US TreasUly or agency instruments (e.g. , bonds or notes). With respect to cash-settled markets, the CFTC explains that its focus is on the integrity of the cash price series used to settle the futures contract. The size of a trader's position at the expiration of a cash-settled futures contract cannot affect the price of that contract because the trader cannot demand or make delivery of the underlying commodity.
Since manipulation of the cash market can yield a profit in the futures contract, the CFTC monitors large reportable futures pos itions and is alert for unusual cash market activity on the part of large futw·es traders, which is particularly important during the time in whic h fma l cash price for futures settlement is determined.
Non-Government Detection
It is not only governments that can use screens to detect manipulation. This section describes a recent use of screens by one of co-authors of this piece and two other scholars (Abrantcs-Mctz, Kraten, Metz and Scow (2008)), which flagged a possible conspiracy and manipulation of the U .S. Dollar London Interbank Offered Rate ("Libor"). 185 T he results of this study, and pre liminary evidence previous ly put forward by the Wall Street Journal , warranted a closer look at the data. all developed a keen in terest in understanding whether Libor acted atypically during the crisis, and whether, if it did, this was the rcsul~ of human manipulation. Initial interest in the potential manipulation of L1bor is the result of screen application. Not only did this screen help to raise initial concerns as to Libor d isru ption; it also directed subsequent inquiries as to which periods oftime most warrant additional scrutiny. The design of the study was as follows: Abrantes-Metz and colleagues compared the one month Libor and the four month Libor-thc rate at which large London banks purport to be able to bon·ow on an unsecured basis fo r one and three months at a time-to the Federal Funds Effective rates. The authors present the results for the one-month Libor and explain that they are qual itatively identical for the three-month Libor. These rates should not be identical. The Federal Funds Effective rate represents overnight loans from one depositmy institution to another. However, given the shoti-term, unsecured nature of the loans, it would be intuitive for them to exhibit some relationship . Similarly, when Abrantes-Metz and her colleages compare Libor to the one-month Treasury rate, it would be unsurprising if some historic relationship existed. Libor may be a higher rate than the Treasury ra te because it exposes lenders to the risk of a bank's default rather than that of the United States itself, presumably a higher risk,I 90 but both include the cost of bonowing money. For them to w ildly diverge for no reason would be cause for some subsequent inqui1y.
Abrantcs-Mctz and her colleagues determined the typical spread between Libor and these other rates going back to 1990 and then compared it to the spreads during recent months. The Figure below, 193. A~ran~es-Metz et al. , ~upra note 11 9. In many data sets, tbe distribution of digits has a natur~l, r~gu_Iarl~ occumng pattern. Benford 's Law is a mathematica l formula that descnbes th1s dJstnbutron. _Sh.r~ics have shown that the law applies to a surprisingly large num~er of data sets, and v10 latrons ca n raise questions as to whether the data have been man~pul_ated or artificially ge~erated. Benford's Law is commonly applied in accounting applrcat10ns to screen for manrpulated or fa lsifi ed financial statements. While the research s tudies c ited above generally acknowledge anomalies in the Libor quote data, they are merel y suggestive of wrongdoing. In fact, the 2008 study by Abrantes-Metz and her colleagues specifica ll y benchmarks the Libor aga inst other contemporaneous shoJiterm, risk-free rates in periods not suspected of manipulation, applies those benchmarks to the suspect periods, and finds that the average level of the Libor docs not deviate in a statistically significantly manner from these bench marks. Yet screens like th is have he lped trigger investigations that will look for other evidence for or against the suspicious behavior. Ultimately, very profitable manipulations could have happened within the margin of cnor, making even low certainty res ults warrant further in vestigation. The Libor litigation will provide a fruitful example of the multiple uses of screens, and it has already shown how powerfu l these can be in identifying s ituations warranting a c loser look.
Whi le the CFTC maintains extens ive monitoring systems, j ournalists and economists flagged the Libor disruption. There is no reason for screening tools to be isolated to the govern ment, and Libor shows the great fru its of non-governmental screen use. There are many uses of screens for market pa rti cipants. lt is critica l for market players to know and anticipate how they may be screened. For potential p laintiffs, screening teclmiques may help them to note potential manipulation at all, the first step in redressing it. Potentia l defendants would do well to establish screening w ithin their governa nce and compliance programs. Insofar as fmns do not w ish to be the tar gets of investi gations and lawsuits, they will attempt to prevent their own staff from engaging in man ipulative actions that can be imputed to the firm . Screens can be a crucial tool in helping firms locate and stop problems within their own house, rather than in a court later. lt is fa r better to hear about and remedy manipulation detected through an inhouse screen than after a conversation with regulators.
Any of the indi vidual banks prov iding Libor quotes could have (and some of them might have) used s uch methods themselves to identify the same anomalies in real time. An internal audit or compliance ftmction, by anticipating these regulatory investigations, could have protected the banks against allegations of malfeasance, or at least could have been an important factor in convincing authorities that significant efforts had been made by the company to detect any possible wrongdoing, if any did exist. They could also have been used by th e agenc ies themselves to flag the possibi lity of wrongdoing.
B. Screens in Proof
Although recklessness will now suffice rather than intentional U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSI NESS L AW [Vol. 15:2 mtifi ciality, econometric proof has not been reduced in impmtance for adjudication. Artificiality may not be an clement in 180.1 actions, but sca le of price distortion may be an important factor in computing damages, as will causation. 194 Screens can be a useful tool in establi shing damages and causation, and as well as pressing a 180.2 claim with respect to swaps. For obvious reasons, any empirical approach to present or defend allegations of fraud and manipulation relies not only on the actual facts of the case, but also on the type of direct evidence avai lable. For example, a 180.1 action could be brought in part based on cmails between traders that seem to indicate the use of a fraudulent device. But trader-speak can often be ambig uous, and suppmting economic evidence may help prove or disprove that their communications indicated fraud . Economic analyses in general, and screens and other types of empiri cal approaches in patticular, can play critical roles in these circumstances. Scholars have been calling for increased attention to economic analyses for some time.
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The success of screens in focusing attention on Libor and the new CFTC rules simply offer the most opportune moment yet for commodities manipulation law to move forward.
The role of econom ic analysis and the economic expert can be very impmtant in inferring intent under these circumstances by performing a variety of studies on what is " usual" market and trading behavior and what may be considered " unusual" and potentially indicative of manipulation.
This section presents possibl e empirical analyses for hypothetical situations that may be undcttaken for particular types of cases.
I . Possible Empirical Analyses for a Hypothetical Case Brought
Under Rule 180.1
Imagine that the CFTC has brought allegations of conspiracy and manipulation against traders in a financial services firm called Gospis and brokers in a brokerage firm called Brokatus. Specifically, the CFTC al.legcs that some brokers from Brokatus conspired to obtain new business and increase ex isting business in swaps as well as in cash and futures transactions from Gospis' traders. Thi s group of brokers (call it "allegedly tainted brokers") provided a variety of gifts to the aforementioned group of traders (call it "allegedly tainted traders"), a practice that was not allowed 194. Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)( I O)(C)(ii) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 9( 10)(c)(ii)) (allowing treble damages).
195. See, e.g., PiJTOng, supra note 17, at 63 (prescribing that "the amended law should explicitly prescribe, endorse, or recommend the use of statistical and econometric methods to establish the existence of specific anomalous price and quantity relations" in order to enhance the efficiency of U.S. fu ture market anti-manipulation regu lation).
20 13] REVOLUTION IN MANTPULATION LAW 407 by either B rokatus or Gospis. The CFTC a lso put forward the theory that the allegedly tainted brokers were of lower quality when compared to the other brokers at Brokatus, which was the reason why they had to bribe traders at Gospis.
An economic expert employed by one of the parties will undertake a variety of analyses to determine whether there is any empirical support for these allegations. There are fundamentally two inqui ries to purs ue. First, was there a causal relationship between gifts and trade execution qual ity. Second, was there an incenti ve for the tainted traders to actually select their brokers based primarily on the gifts received.
On the first point of execution qual ity, one approach is to compare the quality of execution of the pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers during the allegation period against appropriate ly untainted benchmarks. The quality of execution could be measured by the amount by which those trades beat average market prices, thus producing benefits for Gospis. lf gifts were the reason why the tainted traders chose to place thei r trades w ith the tainted brokers, then we should expect to observe a lower quality of execution between these pairs and any other untainted pairs. There are several untainted benchmarks to be considered: (i) the same pa irs of a llegedl y tainted h·adcrs and brokers before the allegation period; (ii) the same allegedly tainted h·adcrs when placing their h·adcs with untainted brokers during the allegation period; (iii) untainted traders when placing the orders with allegedly tainted brokers during the allegation period; and (iv) untainted h·aders when placing their h·ades with untainted brokers.
The economic expert w ill search for lower execution quality for the pairs of allegedly tainted h·aders with allegedly tainted brokers during the allegation period, when compared to any of the four benchmarks above. Changes in the relationships between allegedly tainted h·aders with allegedly tainted brokers from before the allegation period to during the a llegation period would also be considered, and compared to changes during the same periods of time between any of the benchmark groups.
Just as important as the choice of the benchmarks is the specification of the model explaining quality of execution. It is important to frame the analysis in the context of a multiple regression model so that a variety of potentially re levant factors can be taken into consideration, and a measure of materiality can be scientifically obtained tlu·ough statistical significance. Such factors to take into account are: the characteristics of the contracts and swaps involved; the h·ading conditions on a daily basis (for example, if there was any relevant news on those days); the time of the h·ansaction (was it in the last few minutes before floor trading closed for the day), or time to floor trading close; market depth; market liquidity; floor versus electronic trading; market volume for the day and during the last few [Vol. 15:2 minutes of floor trading when applicable; relative size of the trade in terms of vo lume for the re levant time period; number of transactions in the last few minutes; times when brokers received traders' orders and execution times of those trades; relevant sectors; specific transaction orders (as for example, if the broker can break a large trade into severa l blocks or not) and order types; portfolio manager instructions; multi-broker placements; relevant price average values and volatility; recent relevant ptices trends; basis value when applicable (measured as the futures minus the spot/cash price); residual interfund trades; number of other trades p laced in the same few minutes interval; day of the week; and potentially other factors.
With the results of these models, a variety of tests can be run in order to establish any material differences in execution quality for the pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers during the a llegation period, when compared to benchmarks.
Are the qualities of execution from the allegedl y tainted pairs statistically different from, in particular lower than, the qualities of execution for any of the other benchmark pairs?
After taking into account all of the factors that may explain quality of execution as outlined above, let's consider the regression etTors as containing all other explanations for execution quality that were not directly controlled for in om model. Do these regression errors differ in tenns of variances, and overall distributions, between the allegedly tainted pairs and any of the benchmarks?
Does the execution quality of allegedly tainted pairs present the same variability over time as those from benchmarks?
How do the trades from these pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers compare to the overall universe of trades between all traders and all brokers? Do they tend to be on the lower end of the distribution?
Are there either a larger number of negative qual ities of execution for the allegedly tainted trader and broker pairs, or more significant negati ve values, when compared to the benchmarks?
Suppose there are 30 such pairs of allegedly tainted traders and brokers, and that there is a universe of 450 pairs of traders and brokers that are untainted (benchmarks (i)-(iv)). If we draw 10 random samples of qua lities of execution from the 450 untainted pairs of size 30 pairs each, how do these compare to the qualities of execution of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs? Can we distinguish the 30 allegedly tainted pairs against any of the other random samples of the same size, in terms of any of the relevant features of the quality of execution?
The same analyses that are carried out for the group of tainted traders and brokers over time would also be undct1aken at a more micro level, such as the ones outlined below. 
409
On a daily basis, how does the intraday variability of the qualities of execution for the a llegedly tainted traders and brokers compare to the intraday volatility for the remaining benchmarks?
Are there a larger proportion of negative qualities of executi on for the allegedly tainted pairs than for the benchmarks on a daily basis? Arc the negative values for the quali ties of execution of the allegedly tainted pairs larger in terms of magnitude than those of the untainted pairs, again on a daily basis?
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs during the allegation period, can we identify any particular pairs which seem more suspicious in terms of the characteristics of the quality of execution, meaning that performed worse in terms of qua lity of execution?
Amongst all of the 30 allegedly tainted pairs, what was the proportion that performed better than the average of all trades, the same, and worse than the average of al l h·ades? How do these proportions compare to the same proportions across all of the untainted pairs? And how do these proportions compare with respect to those in 10 random samples of size 30 untainted pairs each?
Of course, other more specific analyses may also be undertaken by defendants' economic expert and the CFTC, but for the most part, their core would be similar to those outlined above.
With respect to the second point on the incentive of tTaders to select brokers based primarily on gifts received, these traders had stTong financial incentives to perform well. Traders had the incentive to choose the "right" brokers so that their compensation could be maxi mized.
Traders' compensation was based on their financial performance, which is a function of a volume-weighted price metric for all of their tra nsactions, and also of the classification of the h·aders' work by their respective pmtfolio managers.
H ence, a starting analysis on the incenti ve question would compare the quarterly compensations for the allegedly tainted pairs of traders and brokers against the compensations of the same benchmarks in (i)-(iv) factoring in other relevant and determining factors. The analysis would pose similar questions about the compensations of these allegedly tainted pairs as those in ( 1) through (9) above. Of course, this analysis is quarterly rather than daily, and other important factors may also ha ve to be controlled for when conducting an appropriate compensation analysis such as tenure as a trader and the percentage of trades in swaps, cash and futures, among others. Additionally, empirical analyses addressing the timing of transactions between allegedly tainted pairs and the reception of gifts would possibl y also be undet1aken.
Additional analysis related to al legations of a conspiracy would also In a llegations of actual manipulation, we may expect the CFTC to continue following the four tests addressing the following questions: (I) did the accused have the ability to influence market prices; (2) was there an intent to create or affect prices not reflecting legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) did attificial prices exist; and ( 4) did the accused cause such artificial prices.
An economic expeti on an alleged manipulation case will often start by considering two main lines of inquiry. First, she will assess whether the defendant had the capability of affecting prices, and secondly, whether an artificial price was generated as a consequence of the alleged conduct. Depending on the specifics of the case, the incentive test may come in sooner or later in the analysis by the economic expert.
As an example, let's suppose the following allegations of direct and indirect manipulation of NYMEX settlement prices. The CFTC alleges that a patticular individual, "the defendant," has manipulated downwards the NYMEX settlement prices for commodity A on specific days during the period of 2002 through the end of 2004, and as a consequence it indirectly manipulated downwards the NYMEX settlement prices for closely related commodity B. Allegedly, the defendant was selling large quantities of this commodity on or about the last minute of floor trading, offering to sell at prices noticeably lower than those seen in the market at that moment in time. Allegedly, the defendant entered the market in days specifically relevant for his trading in other commodities. Namely, the defendant had a large amount of contracts for commodity B, which is closely related to commodity A. In particular, the defendant had entered into conh·acts to purchase large volumes of commodity B, whose price has a high and positive correlation with the ptice of commodity A. According to the CFTC, since the defendant's positions were significantly larger in the market for cotmnodity B than in the market for cotru11odity A , what the defendant lost in terms of selling A at "too low prices" he more than offset 196. For an explanation of a variety of screens that can be used when studying alleged in profit by buying Bat "too low prices. "
We wi ll start by focusing first on the question of whether the defendant had the capabil ity to affect market prices. The economist must first define the re levant market. Should the relevant market be essentially restricted to commodities A and B transacted on the floor of the NYMEX, or should it also incorporate electronic transactions on these commodities? Should transactions on these commodities performed at the London Metal Exchange (LME) be included? Should other closely related commodities also be inc luded in the relevant market?
Secondly, the economist must determine how large are the trades placed by the de fendant compared to the overall market volume to establ ish whether the defendant had the capability to manipulate prices. Determinations will have to be made as to the relevant time period of trading and on the location and type of trading as well. In our case, the allegations are that the defendant manipulated NYMEX settlement prices for commodities A and B by trading large quantities in the floor in the last few minutes of floor trading. Clearly, the economist needs to focus on the NYMEX settlement prices and on the volume during the last few minutes of trading, though the overall dail y volume may also be relevant. Additionally, both floor and electronic h·ading during the last minutes of floor trading are part of the calculations of the NYMEX settlement prices for both commodities; therefore both of these should be taken into account when estimating the defendant's relative market size. Often, individual Ooor h·ade volumes are not publicly available, but sometimes it is possible for the economist to provide an estimate of these in order to infer the relative s ize of each trade.
Once the above determinations are made, the economist wi ll then be able to start analyzing whether prices on those markets were artificial during the days in which manipulation allegedly occurred, and in case such price artificiality is found, whether the defendant's actions were the cause. Let's suppose that in this hypothetica l the relevant market is defined by the two commodities, and the transactions involved are those placed on the floor of the NYMEX and electronically. Some of the approaches that may be relevant in this context are described below.
One natural approach is to use a market model to "screen" the markets for price artificiality. The question is, "had the CFTC built such a screen to flag unexpected patterns in these NYMEX settlement prices, would it have flagged the days in which the defendant sold commodity A as days in which the NYMEX settlement price was unexpectedly low?"
Let's focus on commodity A, as the analysis for commodity B is similar in nature. The economist may construct a market model that explains variation in the daily changes in NYMEX settlement prices for (Vol. 15:2 commodity A based on various exogenous variables that are not affected by the defendant's trading in this market. A market model incorporates returns (or changes) in an overal l market index to track the performance of the entire economy, a commodity-specific index such as a spot index, and perhaps other factors such as ETFs. These models typically have a high explanatory power for changes in the dependent variable, NYMEX settlement prices changes in this case.
The next step is to analyze the excess returns for the NYMEX settlement prices, i.e., the part of the change in the NYMEX settlement prices which cannot be explained by legitimate changes in the va riables used in the model, and to correlate these with the defendant's trading activity. Is there a statistically significant correlation between negative and statistica lly significant excess returns for the NYMEX settlement prices for commodity A and the days that the defendant was in the market selling these futures conn·acts at allegedly "too low" prices?
Now, an absence of con-elation may be compel ling evidence of an absence of causation. But the reverse is far more tenuous: there can be a number of reasons why two things may be con·elated without assuming that one causes the other. One of the most likely is that we have omitted a relevant factor from om market model that drives both the NYMEX settlement price and the defendant's decision to sell that commodity on the same day, generating a positive corre lation between the two. Such a factor could be a particular piece of news on that commodity on that day, or simply the fact that the market volume has attained a high or a low, or even news related to monetary policy, for example. Hence, causality needs to be appropriately addressed in the context of an event study, in which relevant news are researched and timed to changes in relevant prices so that the cause of the price change can be identified, and intraday analyses may well be required.
Another possible analysis based on the screening model is to look into the transitions from selling and not selling the commodity. Divide the space of actions into in-in, in-out, out-out, out-in: (i) " in-in" arc days in which the defendant was in the market sell ing the cmm11odity and continued in the market the following day; (ii) "out-i n" represent moving from a day in which he did not sell the commodity to a day in which he did, and comparable defi nitions for out-out and in-out. The economic expert may test whether there are s udden price jumps downwards on out-in days, and s udden price jumps upwards on in-out days, wh ich would be consistent with the allegations of manipulation downwards of commodity A. A variety of other tests could also be performed in this framework.
Other, more common tests of price attificiality include the analysis of the basis for the relevant contracts, defined as the difference between the 20 13) REVOLUTION fN MAN fPULATION L AW 413 futures price today for the relevant contract minus the spot or cash price today for the same commodity. Comparisons can be made between the basis during days in which the defendant sold commodity A against those days in which he did not, or between prior and post alleged manipulation periods, or against the basis of other untainted contracts. Is the bas is for the allegedly manipu lated contracts negative (i.e., does backwardation ex ist), or more negative on days in which the defendant sold futures contracts fo r commodity A at al legedly "too low" prices? Movements in the basis may also have to be control led for in terms of other re levant market variables.
Yet another set of analyses that an economist wi II need to undertake are those related to the intent to manipulate, as discussed in section 2. Despite the difficulty in ana lyzing intent, an economic expe1t may have several potentially relevant analyses to pursue.
Analyses related to liquidity, market depth and price discovery, described above in the context of price attificiality, may all also play an impmtant role when address ing intent. If the defendant intends to affect prices, it is easier to do so w hen trading dming times of the day in which liquidity is low, which corresponds to times when the market does not have much depth, or on particular days in which that is more the case than others. Additionally, he may more easily affect prices if he tries to affect the market in which pri ce discovery takes place.
Analyses of trading patterns may be critical when addressing intent. They do not require a price effect, but simply flag trading patterns consistent with a higher likelihood of intent to affect prices as being "unus ual" in some sense for these markets. One such approach is to empirically shtdy the reasons why the defendant decided to n·adc in the specified markets on the particular days that he did, using factors that can be measured. Was his decision to trade based on relevant exogenous events? Does he typically trade on days in which volume is high, or days in which particular macroeconomic news occur? Decision-making mode ls may be developed and estimated to determine the factors more highly con·clated with the defendant' s trading patterns to sec if these, rather than an intent to affect price, can explain his trading pattern.
An economic expert will likely also want to study p rofitability from the alleged conduct. She w ill compute actual profitability from this strategy and compare it aga inst defendant's profitability in other moments in time. She may also study whether the alleged mi sconduct is timed to the defendant's quarterly assessments on which his compensation w ill be detcnnined. Additionally, she may estimate shadow sn·ategies that the defendant would likely have undertaken had he not n·aded in the commodities markets allegedly manipulated, to estimate what would but-for profits have been under such shadow trading pattems and compare them against his actual profits.
The lower CFTC burden of proof enables more elaborate, more indepth, and more creative economic and empirical approaches. With proportionally less emphasis on the subjecti ve state of intent, the new recklessness standard denotes greater willingness to consider objective indicia of manipulation. Although the law has always made use of empirical proofs in manipulation, it has done so grudgingly at times. The new rules create new reasons and opportunities for the law to make usc of economic expertise.
C. Screens at the Pleading Stage 197
Many argued that our pre-existing manipulation laws were sufficient ~o a?dress the challenges manipulation poses. For example, Pirrong unpl1ed that the faults in Commodity Exchange Act enforcement came lar~el~ from the unwillingness of the courts and agencies to engage in statistical analysis of prices-but that the law itself was sufficient. 198 One student note examining Libor recommended cosmetic changes to the BBA ' s Libor govemance, but saw no need for legal recommendations, 199 and another note surveyed manipulation scholarship in the wake of the Sumitomo copper manipulation and argued that existing laws should suffice.
20° For those who were content with the status quo, Dodd-Frank has created open season for manipulation enforcement and give n regulators too much power. While the new rules extend their reach to cover transactions that would have eluded enforcement before, there are also concerns about the power of the dramatic expansion of rcgulat01y authority under Dodd-Frank. Just as the Rules wi ll require economic methods to operate, their di zzying scope should be li mited by broad application of these methods at the pleading stage. With new recklessness and attempt prongs, many more defendants can be drawn into investigation and litigation . The defensive use of econometric tools will prove vital for innocent defendants who seck to avoid suit. Ideally, the courts will be receptive to such approaches, allowing econon'lic proof at the pleading stages as defendants advert to Iqbal and Twombly. As discussed in Abrantes-Metz (20 1 0)~ some of these patterns may indeed be sufficiently unusual as to pass the h1 ghcr standards for pleading antitrust conspiracy claims set forth by the Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 20 1 This section urges that the fai lure to trigger any screen may be useful to a cowt in determining whether a plaintiff has pled with sufficient specificity to overcome Twombly.
. .
If, by contrast, courts allow their unfettered usc by the Comm iSSIOn and plaintiffs, the new rules could see substa~tial cost.s ~n? risks ~or legitimate market participants and lower the qualtty and ll qUJdity of pnce discovery and hedging. Concerns were voiced by a number of mar~<et participants and experts in comments submitted during the rule-makmg period for sections 180.1-180.2, expressing worries about th~. proposed rules. The American Bar Association emphasized that the add1t10n of the OTC swap market to the scope of the manipulation rules m~~es it all the more important that rules be clear. Unlike market-based partJctpa~ts~ OTC participants do not yet have real-time feedback from the Commtsswn or exchange as to the legality of their activities . 202 . . .
Platts's comment, for instance, focused on its role prov1dmg pnce discovery and the ways in which the proposed rules agai~s.t price manipulation could potentially create a disincentive to th~ entltt~s. t!1at provide Platts with information, hindering its data gathenn~ actJVI~Jes. Argus' s comment was straightforwardly critical. Argus is a maJor prov1der of price information on various physical commodities. Its concern .w~s that " the proposed rul es may unnecessaril y chill the voluntary ~ubmisston . of transaction related data by market participants to comptlers of pncc indices." 203 As Platts put it, "[e]ffcctive price discovery in physical energy markets depends on the willingness of companies to recognize the collective good of engaging in price formation tlu·ough the voluntary and transparent reporting of trade data, including bids, offers a~d actual transactions, to publishers of price assessments such as Platts ."- [Vol. 15:2 under Dodd Frank had a long and successful provenance, da ting back to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commiss ion 's 2003 Policy Statement on Natural Gas and Electric Price Indices, and s uccessfully argued for its simi lar application herc. 205 Though the outer reaches of the new rule's power is extensive, its hl.Je reach w ill depend on judicial h·catment. In particular, courts may be inclined to moderate its power at the pleading stage. If legitimate market participants can dispe nse with the cost of litigating CEA c la ims before those expenses mount, than much of the uncertainty and cost will be relievcd? 06 We describe below the process of developing a new screen for the purpose of evaluating a purported man ipulation. Innova tive screens like this one can help patticularly at the pleading stage. If the plaintiff's manipulation claim can be cheaply and efficiently discredited, then more resources can be dedicated to meritorious claims and innocent defendants can avoid serious costs. The use of these tools will be more important than ever in establishing limits to the power of the new rules.
Innovations in screens, typically driven by litigation parties, can, if credited in cou1t, constihlte genuine improvements in how and what legal factfinders can know. Party innovations can a lso dri ve the creation of tools that are subsequently added to the arsenal of tools for prosecuting financial manipulation by regulators.
Given their tTemendous complexity, commodity manipulation will often require the deve lopment of new screens speci~c~lly tailored to the allegations at hand. Below we provide a closing descnptlve summary of the many uses that can be made of screens.
D. Uses of Screens
A screen is a statistical tes t aimed at identi fying potentia l market misconduct. Its uses are m any, but non-litigation detection and litigation are the primary families of uses.
I . Detection
Perhaps the primary use that 1s made of screens ts detection. 207 205. Platts Comment Letter on Rules 180. 1 and 180.2 at 2. 206. One important factor to note in adjudicating between the promise and overbreadth of the new CFTC rules is the argument of Keith Hylton that pleading standards should depend on the evidentimy demands and social costs of a given form of litigation. See Kei th N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summa1 y Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 39 (2008) .
207. Below we provide examples using just one kind of screen that one of the co- Detection invo lves employing a screen to identify a potential manipulation, as w as discussed in depth above. Detection is of usc to multiple individua ls impacted or interested in potential market manipulations.
Competition authorities and government regulators . wi ll. w.ant to ma~e extensive usc of screens to case the work of tdenttfymg potcnt1al manipulations requiring regulatory scrutiny. Academics interested in the issue will want to employ them, as w ill enterprising plaintiffs who want to corroborate their case. 20 R Fmther afield are additional uses for screens. Companies considering prospective j oint ventures or mergers and acquisitions stand to benefit from identifying potential liabilities. Selfregulatory authorities, w hether industry wide or specific, may also ~ant to use screens in monitoring their members. Lastly, corporate mternal compliance stands to benefit e normously from well-applied screens, which may nip fmthcoming manipulations in the bud.
Litigation
The other primary forum for the effective and efficient use of screens is in Iitigati on. 209 Every constihlent of the litigation process will benellt from the apt use of screens. Screens are often used, as discussed above, for identifying potential manipulation and can be aggressively utilized at the pleading and proof stage. Importantly, though, screens can also be used to exonerate in nocent defendants, potentiall y at each of these stages. ln both cases, it is the factfi nder that a lso benefits from the appropriate usc of statistical evidence. Moreover, thi s is h·uc at unexpected phases of an action. Class certil!cation and damages w ill also potentially benefit from I . . 2 10 screen app tcatJon. CONCLUSION The law of commodities manipulation has been definitionally U. OF PENNSY LVANIA JOURNAL OF BUS INESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 confused, doctrinally cha llenged, and nearly unwinnablc in practice. In the aftermath of a disastrous global fmancial crisis, the CFTC has adopted a new set of regulations of striking scope and depth. T his Article a nal yzed the tectonic shift those regulations represented for the legal landscape and made th ree primary claims. First, manipulation in financial markets increasingly requires powerful tools for detection and prosecution. The inclusion of swaps within the CEA manipulation regime, and the worldwide focus on Libor, underscores that the new CFTC ru les have dramatic advantages alongside their significant potential for abuse. Second, that the new CFTC rules require more complex, subtle, and innovative economic analyses. While engaging the debate at a theoretical level, we also provided extensive demonstrations of how a sophisticated economic approach might work under the new law. Third, we argued for an increased role for empiricism in the evidentiaty law SUJTOltnding manipulation, re-engaging a decades-old debate on the place of economic anal yses in the law.
